



**Razumkov**  
centre

# UKRAINE: FROM WAR TO PEACE AND RECOVERY

Analytical Assessments  
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# I.

## NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE: KEY DEVELOPMENTS, PROCESSES, TRENDS

In October 2024, the high intensity of hostilities and the main recent trends in the ongoing conflict remained unchanged. The Russian side maintained the upper hand in most land battles, gaining significant territorial victories. However, these successes were mainly tactical and political in nature and did not alter the overall military-strategic situation or the nature of the war of attrition.

Meanwhile, the slow but steady advancement of Russian troops perpetuates the perception of Russia's «invincibility» and strengthens the argument for initiating «peace» negotiations on terms that hardly guarantee a lasting and just peace or a permanent ceasefire. As a result, the Kremlin seems to have an effective strategy for achieving its war aims, while President Zelenskyy's Victory Plan has received a rather restrained response from international partners, highlighting the ineffectiveness of their strategy to prevent Ukraine's defeat and minimise own risks.

### COMBAT ACTION

The lively discussions in late October about the «collapse of the frontline» in both domestic and foreign information space indicate a critical situation in several areas where the enemy has concentrated its offensive. Russia's superiority in manpower and munitions allowed it to implement the tactics of creeping occupation along large parts of the front and penetrate the Ukrainian defence lines by about 30 km. Within a month, the Russian occupiers have captured 472 sq.km of Ukrainian territory and two dozen settlements, including the towns of Vuhledar and Selidove. During the last week of October, the enemy's advance has been the fastest since the end of the initial phase of the full-scale invasion.

The fiercest fighting was observed in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions, where the enemy made significant progress. The Ukrainian defence forces (AFU) failed to stabilise the front line in the Vuhledar area. In other critical areas, including the Kharkiv sector, where the Russians have not abandoned their attempts to create a «buffer zone», the AFU mostly managed to hold back the Russian troops. One of the few positive developments in October has been the [narrowing gap](#) in the number of artillery shells, thanks to [increased supplies](#) from partners and [domestic producers](#), as well as the destruction of several [Russian arsenals](#). Currently, the ratio is 2:1 still in favour of the Russians, but in early 2024 they had a 7-8-fold advantage.

Manoeuvre combat operations continued in the area of the Kursk operation. Thanks to the gradual build-up of their forces and the intensive use of air force, the Russians regained control of about half of the previously lost territories. As before, the effectiveness and expediency of the Kursk operation are still contentious, with [differing views](#) on its impact. The achievement of one of the main [military and political goals](#) of strengthening Ukraine's negotiating position remains uncertain in the overall theatre of operations. President Zelenskyy has previously [emphasised](#) the strategic significance of the Kursk operation as part of Ukraine's Victory Plan.

In late October, there was first evidence of North Korean military participation on the side of Russia, presumably in the Kursk region. Estimates suggest that the North Korean contingent could number more than 10,000 troops, providing a significant reinforcement to the existing 50,000-strong Russian grouping operating in the area.

Russian attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine are intensifying for the second consecutive month. Russians are using drones of various modifications more frequently [while limiting the number of missiles](#) and increasing the effectiveness of their use, striking at targets that are least protected by Ukrainian air defence systems. Ukrainian [port infrastructure on the Black Sea](#) is a key focus for Russian attacks, including targeting foreign civilian vessels in October. The objective of these attacks is to undermine Ukraine's capacity to maintain the grain corridor and inflict economic harm by damaging maritime trade infrastructure and impeding grain export revenues.

The use of different types of UAVs in October set a new sad record of [2,023](#) (compared to [1,330](#) in September [6,987](#) in total since the beginning of 2024). Even the low percentage of drone hits (about 4%), combined with missile and bomb attacks, against which the AFU has no effective means of countering, has caused numerous civilian casualties and destruction. The limited number of missile attacks in recent months suggests that Russia is stockpiling missiles for extensive offensives during the autumn and winter.

Targeted attacks on residential quarters are obviously part of the Kremlin's strategy of terror against the civilian population to weaken the will to resist. Recent [demonstrative executions](#) of Ukrainian prisoners of war are also part of this strategy, aimed at psychologically influencing the AFU fighters and Ukrainian society as a whole. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine [has documented](#) the execution of 102 Ukrainian POWs, with 80% [occurring in 2024](#).

The threatening situation in the theatre of operations and its dynamics raise objective concerns about the ability of the Ukrainian defence forces to stabilise the front line and disrupt the strategic plans of the Russian military and political leadership to expand the operational and tactical results achieved during the summer and autumn offensive campaign. Given the nature of the current stage of the war, both parties are trying to deplete the enemy's combat potential, and the AFU's retreat into the interior may be part

of a strategy to «exchange territory» for the time necessary to accumulate own reserves and continue inflicting objectively higher losses to the advancing enemy.

## **UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR**

On 29 October, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the President's decision to extend martial law and general mobilisation for another 90 days, until 7 February 2025. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, [1.05 million Ukrainian citizens](#) have been mobilised into the Armed Forces, with an additional 160,000 expected to be mobilised over the next three months. It is hard to say whether the declared targets are realistic, as systemic issues with mobilisation remain unresolved. [Legislative, administrative and organisational](#) solutions, as well as [alternative mechanisms](#), have had only a temporary effect. According to the [General Staff](#), in October, a little over 20,000 mobilised persons were simultaneously undergoing training at the AFU training centres, a notable decrease from the previous months (close to 35,000).

As noted above, President Zelenskyy's Victory Plan has received rather lukewarm support from Western partners and has not attracted much interest from the global media. The likely reason for this is not so much the lack of information on the non-public part of the document, but the obvious differences between Ukraine and its partners' visions and methods for ending the war. The main contradictions are over two issues – restoring Ukraine territorial integrity (including Crimea) and providing international security guarantees. Kyiv's uncompromising position on both issues has not met with adequate support from most of its key partners, who would rather insist on a [willingness to compromise](#) on both issues, appealing to «reality» and «realism».

## **FOREIGN EVENTS (EXTERNAL FACTORS)**

The US presidential election has been a topic of discussion in relation to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, but so far there haven't been any direct consequences. The [cancellation](#) of

President Biden's participation in the Ramstein format suggests that the expected decisive actions of the current president at the final stage of his term, if any, were probably postponed until after the election results.

The conflict has now taken on a new level of internationalisation with the deployment of several thousand North Korean troops to the war zone. It is currently known that this contingent will be involved in combat operations in the Russian Kursk region, but there is a possibility that the number of troops and their deployment locations may expand if there is no adequate international response to this new involvement of North Korea in supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine.

As of the end of October, Western leaders limited themselves to condemning the growing military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, but no practical steps were taken to counteract this alliance. [South Korea](#), on the other hand, may revise its stance on providing direct military support to Ukraine. Seoul's [greatest concern](#) includes the risks of Russia transferring nuclear and missile technology to Pyongyang and its potential direct involvement in a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

The conflict in the Middle East did not have a significant impact on the Russia-Ukraine war in October. However, it was [revealed](#) that Israeli strikes on 26 October hit important military-industrial missile production facilities in Iran. This could potentially reduce the volume of Iranian ballistic missile supplies to Russia. The destroyed facilities are [estimated](#) to take a year to be fully restored, meaning Russia will [lose a significant source](#) of ballistic missile supplies for the next 12 months. Western experts [estimate](#) the volume of quarterly Russian purchases of Iranian and North Korean weapons at \$1-2 billion, which is about 15% of total defence procurement.

## RUSSIA

The stagnation of Russian offensive in Kharkiv for months and the failure to dislodge the AFU from the territory of Kursk region

shows that Russia's superiority in human and material resources also has its limits. The Kremlin's decision to engage North Korean troops is likely due to difficulties in replenishing human resources without publicly announcing another wave of mobilisation.

In order to limit international military support and block Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, the Russian regime has traditionally used threats of nuclear escalation to intimidate Western leaders. In addition to periodic nuclear exercises and [demonstrative missile launches](#), Russian diplomatic efforts have been focused on «detailing» and «amplifying» signals of Russia's seriousness, as their statements no longer had the desired effect on American and European elites. «Detailing» means clarifying Russian interpretation of [«escalation steps»](#), which involve a gradual transition from conventional and cyber attacks to a demonstration nuclear strike on an uninhabited area.

### **An analysis of the most important events, political statements and decisions leads to the following conclusions:**

- ✓ as of the end of October 2024, the Ukrainian defence forces have faced some critical threats in several sectors of the frontline, although the overall military and strategic situation and the nature of combat operations as a war of attrition remain unchanged;
- ✓ the question remains whether Ukraine's military and political leadership is able to timely form the capabilities of strategic deterrence of the enemy's offensive and, more importantly, to propose a realistic strategy for ending the war on terms favourable to Ukraine;
- ✓ the new level of conflict internationalisation associated with the direct involvement of the North Korean contingent received no proper response from the international community, but may encourage South Korea to provide more active military assistance to Ukraine.

# II. FOREIGN POLICY

The general picture of global and regional events and processes in October 2024 indicates a growing polarisation in the international community as the democratic world confronts the alliance of authoritarian countries that are strengthening their military and political partnerships and expanding hybrid aggression across the world. This is happening against the uncertainty in the US at the end of the election, the dangerous «internationalisation» of the Ukraine war, the escalation of the Middle East conflict, the destruction of international legal system and the devaluation of security institutions. Under these circumstances, the Ukrainian diplomacy's key priorities are to promote consolidation and unity of the collective West, and to ensure reliable support of allies in the strategic perspective.

## INTERNATIONAL PROCESSES AND EVENTS

In October, the US election campaign was in full swing, with **no clear advantage** for any presidential candidate at the national level and in seven key states. The «Ukrainian theme» was used extensively in the election confrontation, with concerns raised about unacceptable to Kyiv radical statements and plans to end the war in Ukraine by Donald Trump's entourage, the Speaker of the House Mike Johnson and others. Obviously, the post-election transformation of Washington's foreign policy poses both threats and opportunities for Ukraine and Europe, and the global context (the US elections results will be discussed in the next Razumkov Centre's monitoring). The prolonged uncertainty about the United States' future course is encouraging authoritarian states to become more active globally, while weakening the democratic world's main institutions.

The Ukraine war has become even more dangerous due to **North Korea's military assistance** to Russia and the redeployment of its armed forces to the combat zone. Pyongyang regime's participation in the war in Europe can be seen, among other things, as a «force test» of the collective West's possible reaction. Unfortunately, there was no adequate response from partner countries, international institutions, and the international community as a whole to North Korea's involvement in Russian intervention in Ukraine. In his interview with the South Korean TV channel KBS on

31 October 2024, **President Zelenskyy** noted that «so far, the world's reaction to the involvement of North Korean military has amounted to zero». The international community is mostly waiting and watching, which encourages further joint aggressive actions by authoritarian regimes.

The October elections in Moldova and Georgia have highlighted Russia's increasing hybrid expansion. Russia is believed to have launched a **massive hybrid attack** on Moldova, spending around €100 million to interfere in the presidential election and the EU accession referendum. More than 300 cases of voter bribery involving about 300,000 individuals were **reported by the police**. Pro-European forces narrowly won the referendum with 50.5% in favour and 49.5% against the EU accession. Also, despite extensive Russian interference, incumbent President Maia Sandu defeated the pro-Russian Socialist Party candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo with 55% and 45% votes, respectively. It should be added that Russia has managed to consolidate a powerful «fifth column» in Moldova, which will obstruct the country's further progression towards the EU.

In turn, the parliamentary elections in Georgia on 26 October resembled the Belarusian scenario. Despite forecasts and independent exit polls suggesting otherwise, the Georgian Central Election Commission declared the pro-Russian ruling party, Georgian Dream, as the winner with 54% of the votes. This led to widespread protests, with the President alleging fraud and the opposition refusing to accept the election results. International observers from the OSCE reported numerous violations, resulting in several countries imposing sanctions on the current Georgian government. Brussels has called for an investigation into the violations and has suspended Georgia's accession to the EU. As of the end of October, Georgia remains in a state of transition with uncertain prospects for the future.

The situation in the Middle East remains explosive. In response to Tehran's massive missile attack in early October, the Israeli Defence Forces launched a series of strikes on Iranian military facilities. Israel continues to destroy Hezbollah's terrorist infrastructure in southern

Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, while hostilities on the Israeli-Lebanese front remain intense. In view of this, the US Department of Defence has decided to deploy an additional powerful naval contingent to the Middle East.

The 16th BRICS Summit, held in Kazan on 22-24 October, was another attempt to unite «non-Western world». Representatives from 36 countries, including China, India, South Africa, and Iran, attended the summit. Sadly, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres' participation in an event chaired by the Russian dictator in an aggressor's territory is hardly justified. Despite contradictions and problems between the participating countries, uncertainty of common positions and failure of Putin's plans for political and economic integration, the forum showcased the strengthening relations between aggressive autocracies such as China, Russia, and Iran. This was further underscored by North Korea's involvement in the Ukraine war and armed provocations on the South Korean border, China's increasingly militaristic rhetoric, the Joint Sword-2024B military exercises near Taiwan, and the planned partnership agreement between Russia and Iran.

Therefore, the October intensification of the alliance of authoritarian countries exposed the weakness and vulnerability of the collective West and the lack of effective measures and decisive actions in response to North Korea's interference in the Ukraine war, Russia's hybrid expansion in Moldova and Georgia, and other activities.

## **FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES OF UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT**

Kyiv's main priorities on the world stage include accumulating external military, financial and economic assistance, including for the energy sector in the run-up to the winter season; promoting the Victory Plan among allies; completing preparations for the second Peace Summit; continuing signing security cooperation agreements with partner countries; ensuring European and Euro-Atlantic integration, to name a few.

### **Political dialogue with foreign partners**

The above priorities essentially determined the intensive negotiation process. The most important contacts with external partners included the first foreign visit of the new NATO

Secretary General, Mark Rutte on 3 October. It was symbolic for Ukraine, as he discussed Ukraine's integration into the Alliance and support in countering Russian aggression. On 9 October, the Ukraine – Southeast Europe Summit was held in Croatia and included meetings with the leaders of Croatia, Albania, North Macedonia, Slovenia, and Greece. The summit adopted the [declaration](#), which, in particular, emphasised support for Kyiv's interests and initiatives globally.

Following the cancellation of the Ramstein Group meeting, Ukraine had to discuss its Victory Plan bilaterally and at other international platforms. In fact, this was one of the topics of the President Zelenskyy's «express tour» to the UK, Germany and France on 10-12 October. On 16 October, he had a telephone conversation with US President Joe Biden, and the next day, the Ukrainian side presented the Victory Plan in Brussels, at the meetings with the European Council and the European Parliament. Of strategic significance was Ukraine's participation in the 76<sup>th</sup> session of the Nordic Council on 28 October and the 4<sup>th</sup> Ukraine Nordic Summit in Reykjavik. On the sidelines of the summit, Ukraine held talks with the leaders of Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway. The summit's [joint statement](#) declared the Nordic states' support for Ukraine's Victory Plan and its integration into the EU and NATO.

In October, a series of consultations and talks were also held with government officials and MPs from a number of European countries, the United States, Canada, the Global South, and others. Separately, in the context of North Korea's entry into the war against Ukraine, the latter has stepped up its contacts with South Korea at various levels.

Traditional diplomatic procedures included acceptance of credentials from the newly appointed ambassadors of Finland, Brazil, Ireland, Montenegro, Lithuania and Iceland by the President of Ukraine.

### **Promotion of Ukrainian interests and initiatives globally**

Ukraine continued to actively promote its plans and initiatives, primarily related to the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan, both bilaterally and on international platforms.

*First.* As noted, Kyiv has taken a number of diplomatic steps to implement its Victory

Plan that envisages political, military, financial and economic measures to resist Russian intervention and force the aggressor to peace. Discussions of the Ukrainian initiative continue at various levels and formats. At present, there is no consensus among partners on some points of the plan, such as inviting Ukraine to join NATO.

*Second.* Ukraine embarked on active political and diplomatic action to fill the Peace Formula with practical content and prepare for the second Peace Summit. During October, [five international conferences](#) were held on different points of the Peace Formula. In particular, on 17 October, a conference on Radiation and Nuclear Safety was held in Paris (70 countries and international organisations). On 19 October, a conference on Environmental Security was held in Helsinki (60 countries and organisations). On 24 October, Riga hosted a conference on the Implementation of the UN Charter and Restoration of Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and World Order (61 countries and organisations). On 25 October, Kyiv welcomed the participants of the conference on Withdrawal of Russian Troops and Cessation of Hostilities (56 countries and organisations). On 30-31 October, the conference on the Release of Prisoners and Deportees was held in Montreal (over 70 participants).

*Third.* Ukraine continues to prepare and conclude long-term security cooperation agreements with partner countries. In particular, on 9 October, the leaders of Ukraine and Croatia signed the [Agreement on Long-term Cooperation and Support between Ukraine and the Republic of Croatia](#). Subsequently, on 17 October, an agreement on security cooperation was signed with Greece. Talks on concluding similar agreements with Bulgaria, Slovenia and other countries are underway. In parallel, Ukraine and the UK are negotiating a bilateral agreement on the transition to a stronger and deeper partnership.

## UKRAINE'S STEPS TOWARDS THE EU

In October, specific measures were taken by Ukraine to prepare for the practical opening of EU membership talks. In particular, a) the Verkhovna Rada adopted a framework climate law that provides for the achievement of climate

neutrality by 2050; (b) the government approved an action plan for joining the European Employment Services (EURES); (c) the law amending the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine in connection with the ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force; (d) a regular session of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Commission took place as part of the official screening of the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with EU law; (e) organisational meetings and trainings for civil servants were held across Ukraine in preparation for the negotiation process; (f) Ukraine is finalising roadmaps for the establishment of the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, etc.

An important event was the publication of the European Commission's Report on the 2024 Enlargement Package, which salutes Ukraine's progress on the path to European integration, provides recommendations for further reforms and states the prospects for opening negotiating clusters in 2025. In turn, the decision of the European Parliament and the EU Council to provide Ukraine with a €35 billion as part of the G7's overall loan of about €50 billion at the expense of taxes from frozen Russian assets should be considered a positive step.

**October events and processes indicate further division of the international community in the context of the confrontation between the democratic world and the alliance of authoritarian states, spearheaded by the China-Russia-North Korea-Iran bloc. Against the ever-growing aggressive policy of the authoritarian camp, the collective West has become vulnerable, weakened by internal problems and contradictions.**

**In these settings, it is crucial for both Ukrainian diplomacy and allied countries to consolidate their positions against attempts to create a broad anti-Western coalition at the expense of the Global South. At the same time, the priority is to further promote and implement the Ukrainian Victory Plan and expand comprehensive assistance to Kyiv in countering Russian aggression, which has internationalised due to North Korea's direct involvement in the war.**



# CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FIELD

## **DEFENCE OF UKRAINE, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY**

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The Ukrainian parliament's legislative activity traditionally focuses on the protection of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Improvement of this particular segment of legal regulation requires constant attention, as proper organisation of the country's defence is vital for the future of both the Ukrainian state in general and the entire Ukrainian people in particular. It is extremely important to fill in the existing gaps in the regulation, to eliminate or correct certain «inappropriate» or erroneous decisions in this area. The [Law of Ukraine «On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Procedure for Enlistment and Contractual Military Service by Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service and the National Guard](#), adopted on 10 October 2024 and promptly signed by the President, clearly seeks to improve one of the segments of legal regulation related to the organisation of the country's defence. From now on, foreign nationals and stateless persons may be recruited for military service under a contract in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service and the National Guard of Ukraine. Those who have not been previously convicted, who legally reside in Ukraine and meet the following requirements for military service are eligible for contractual service: 1) have reached an appropriate age (the age stipulated by the Law of Ukraine «On Military Duty and Military Service»); 2) have passed a special check of foreign nationals and stateless persons; 3) are fit for military service in terms of health; 4) have passed a professional and psychological selection; 5) have sufficient level of physical training. In order to be accepted for military service, foreign nationals and stateless persons must personally apply to the Recruitment Centre for Foreigners and Stateless Persons, recruitment centres, administrative service centres, employment centres, territorial recruitment centres at their place of residence or temporary stay or apply directly to the military unit where they wish to serve under the contract. After the above agencies consider their applications,

these individuals, excluding those who are enrolled in the intelligence agency of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, are sent to the Recruitment Centre for Foreigners and Stateless Persons for special vetting. This procedure is designed to verify 1) the legality of crossing the state border by such persons upon entering Ukraine and the legality of their stay in Ukraine; 2) the facts of bringing such a person to administrative and criminal liability in accordance with the law, in particular, the facts of committing criminal offences against peace and security of mankind, terrorism and other unlawful acts that directly threaten the vital interests of Ukraine; 3) signs or facts of such person's conduct of intelligence, terrorist and other activities in the interests of foreign states, organisations, groups and individuals to the detriment of the state security of Ukraine, as well as signs of the foreign national's or stateless person's links with individuals who have carried out or are carrying out the relevant activities; 4) other circumstances that may prevent such person from being enrolled for military service under the contract. The law also provides for other conditions, the observance of which is mandatory for the enlistment and military service by foreign nationals and stateless persons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service and the National Guard of Ukraine. This law should definitely be seen as a significant step towards the proper regulation of both the procedure for enrolment and contractual military service by foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine. At the same time, there are many other unresolved issues in this segment that have not been addressed by the legislator and that will require new legislative decisions.

## **IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC COURSE TOWARDS FULL EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIP**

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Ratification of the Rome Statute of the [International Criminal Court](#) by the Ukrainian parliament on 21 August 2024 has been another important step in ensuring irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic course, constitutionally enshrined in 2019. The adoption of the Law of Ukraine «[On Amendments to](#)

the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine in Connection with the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and Amendments thereto» on 9 October became the logical continuation of Ukrainian parliament's legislative activity in this direction. From now on, foreign nationals and stateless persons not permanently residing in Ukraine who have committed any of the crimes under Articles 437-439, 442, 442-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (planning, preparation, unleashing and waging of an aggressive war; violation of the laws and customs of war; use of weapons of mass destruction; genocide; crimes against humanity) outside Ukraine are subject to liability in Ukraine under the Criminal Code of Ukraine if such persons are on the territory of Ukraine and cannot be extradited (transferred) to a foreign state or international judicial institution for prosecution, or if their extradition (transfer) is refused. The law also provides for criminal liability of military commanders, other persons de facto acting as military commanders and other superiors. Thus, a military commander or other person de facto acting as a military commander is subject to criminal liability for any of the crimes under Articles 437-439, 442 and 442-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, committed by a subordinate person who was at the time of the crime under such commander's actual command and control or, depending on the circumstances, under his actual power, as a result of his failure to exercise proper control over such person, if at the same time the military commander or other person de facto acting as a military commander, knew or, taking into account the circumstances at the time, should have known and could have known that the said subordinate committed or intended to commit such a crime, but failed to take the actions that he should have and could have taken within his authority to prevent or stop the commission of the crime or to report such a crime to the competent authority. The same responsibility concerns superiors, whose legal status is not discussed above. In addition, the legislators have updated the criminal law provisions on the definition of «genocide» and «crimes» against humanity' (Articles 442, 442-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

The adoption of the Law of Ukraine «On the Basic Principles of the State Climate Policy» on 8 October 2024 can be considered another step towards ensuring the irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic course. The purpose of this regulatory act is to define the legal and organisational foundations of the state climate policy aimed at ensuring low-carbon and sustainable development of Ukraine, its environmental, food and energy security, achieving climate neutrality, mitigating and adapting to climate change, fulfilling Ukraine's international commitments in the field of climate change, improving the national system of inventory of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from sources and absorption of greenhouse gases, ensuring the functioning of the national system to monitor and evaluate the progress towards the goals of the state climate policy and climate change forecasting. The Law establishes the goals and principles of the state climate policy, state regulation and management in the state climate policy, its scientific support, planning, etc. In particular, the Law regulates relations arising in the course of the formation and implementation of the state climate policy and is aimed at achieving climate neutrality, mitigation of climate change and adaptation to it, ensuring low-carbon and sustainable development, environmental, food and energy security of Ukraine. It is specifically stated that in order to meet Ukraine's obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, this Law is aimed at implementing the *acquis communautaire* of the European Union in the field of climate change, in particular Regulation (EC) No. 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action and Regulation (EU) No. 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021, establishing a framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EC) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) defining the basis for achieving climate neutrality and the European Climate Legislation.

# IV.

## ECONOMY

Ahead of the US elections, when global economic and financial risks are growing, partner democracies are trying to find institutional measures to support Ukraine. A landmark decision was made after the EU countries [agreed](#) on a mechanism to provide Ukraine with a €35 billion loan to be repaid at the expense of russia. This is the European share of the \$50 billion (€45 billion) loan from the G7 countries, which will be financed by future investment income from frozen russian sovereign assets. The loan will have a repayment period of 45 years.

The new macro-financial assistance will be tied to the same political conditions as the existing EU financial assistance mechanism, the Ukraine Facility, which will improve monitoring and control over the flow of funds.

However, even if finally approved, this decision does not seem easy to implement. Hungary has already announced its [intention to block the decision](#) on \$50 billion loan to Ukraine until after the US presidential election. In addition, Budapest postponed the decision to extend EU sanctions against russia and stated that the countries should wait and see the direction in which the future US administration would be moving in terms of assistance to Ukraine.

In turn, the United States [insists on re-viewing the terms](#) of the extension of EU sanctions against russia, proposing to change it from six months to three years to ensure stable financing of the loan.

Other sources of assistance to Ukraine, of course, include resources of international financial institutions. According to [Reuters](#), the World Bank's Board on 10 October approved the creation of a Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) to support Ukraine, with contributions expected from the United States, Canada and Japan. The exact amounts of such contributions are still being discussed, but they will be secured by interest on frozen russian

assets. It is assumed that the Fund, which will be managed by the World Bank, will help fulfil the G7's promise to provide Ukraine with up to \$50 billion in additional funding by the end of the year.

According to experts, such decisions will allow the G7 countries to [significantly increase funding](#) for Ukraine and fulfil the promises made at the G7 leaders' summit in June.

Ukraine obviously also has to do its homework. According to [the NBU](#), the IMF Executive Board completed the fifth review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) on 18 October 2024. The successful approval of the programme grants immediate access to SDR 834.9 million (USD 1.1 billion in equivalent) to support the state budget. After the tranche is disbursed, the total funding received under the programme will increase to about \$8.7 billion.

Despite the challenges of the ongoing war, Ukraine has been implementing the EFF program effectively, leading to more resilient economic growth in the first half of 2024 than expected by the IMF. However, the IMF has revised its economic forecast for 2024-2025 downwards due to Russia's continued attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure and uncertainties related to the war. The IMF predicts a 3% growth in real GDP for Ukraine in 2024, with economic growth in 2025 ranging from 2.5% to 3.5%. However, the forecast is subject to extremely high risks.

The IMF has «traditionally» emphasised that [domestic revenue mobilisation](#) is crucial for Ukraine to meet its high expenditure needs, respond to shocks, and restore fiscal stability, which will require further tax policy measures, as well as efforts to increase accountability and combat tax evasion.

In addition, a recent decision by the IMF Executive Board to [reduce its fees](#) for emerging economies will positively impact

Ukraine's financing. The average reduction in fees is 36%, which translates to a reduction of around \$130 million in annual costs for Ukraine. Considering future IMF tranches, the total effect over the next five years will be \$650-700 million.

The decision-making process for this reduction was quite controversial due to differing interests between donor and debtor countries. However, the positive role played by leading countries and their central banks in controlling inflation has initiated a cycle of key policy rate cuts, which will eventually lead to decreased lending rates in global finance.

### **DEVELOPMENTS, PROCESSES, TRENDS**

Although the country's economy is showing a 3% growth, most processes are controversial and rather unstable. Thus, according to the Ministry of Finance, in September 2024, the general fund of the state budget received UAH 122.9 billion, of which 96% were tax and customs payments. VAT accounted for half of the revenues – UAH 40.2 billion from goods imported into the customs territory of Ukraine, UAH 22.2 billion from domestically produced goods (UAH 36.4 billion collected and UAH 13.8 billion refunded).

For comparison, in September, the state budget received three times less money than in August, when the general fund received UAH 386.2 billion, including UAH 228.1 billion in financial assistance from international partners. Over the first 9 months of 2024, the general fund of the state budget received UAH 1.542 trillion, while cash expenditures amounted to UAH 2.342 trillion, which means that the deficit was UAH 800 billion.

Inflationary dynamics are also controversial. Inflation in the consumer market accelerated to 1.5% in September, compared to 0.6% in August. On a year-on-year basis, inflation in September rose to 8.6%, and since the beginning of the year, prices have increased by 6.5%. Food products made a substantial contribution to this inflation, with an official increase of 1.8% over the month. In the first half of 2024, the NBU downgraded its inflation forecast to 8.5%, explaining it by the government's planned tax hikes, further damage

to infrastructure, and deepening negative migration trends.

The complexity and ambiguity of the recovery process is also evidenced by the results of the NBU's most recent [quarterly survey](#) (31 July - 28 August 2024): Companies have slightly improved their views of their economic performance for the next 12 months, retained a positive investment outlook, but expect a moderate rise in inflation and exchange rate expectations.

In particular, respondents returned to reporting [positive expectations](#) for the output of Ukrainian goods and services over the next 12 months, the balance of responses («improvement» minus «deterioration») being 3.7%, compared to -0.3% in Q2 2024. Growth in total sales was expected across most sectors (apart from the mining industry), and most of all by respondents from agricultural, transport and communications and manufacturing companies, the balances of responses being 17.9%, 15.7% and 14.5% respectively.

At the same time, respondents were less upbeat about the future financial and economic standings of their companies and staff numbers.

In general, it is argued that the hostilities and their consequences remain, despite some easing, the dominant factor affecting the ability of companies to increase output and improve financial performance.

In this context, building the strength of defence sector, especially in arms production by domestic enterprises in cooperation with international businesses, is a prerequisite for improving economic performance.

Quite encouraging is the fact that, [according to KPMG](#), the M&A market in Ukraine continues to show resilience despite the challenges posed by Russian invasion, which is a sign of the investors' [cautious confidence](#). But more importantly, international defence companies are also increasing their presence in Ukraine, expanding production capacity and investing in technologies that strengthen the country's defence capabilities.

Therefore, as repeatedly emphasised, there is an urgent need and a growing opportunity for Ukraine to join the international modern weapons sector by improving its investment climate and establishing cooperation with leading Western arms manufacturers.

It is not surprising that the war and high risks make Western companies reluctant to enter Ukraine's economic space. It is all the more important that some corporations are still making significant investments. For example, the DVL Group, which includes Datagroup-Volia and lifecell, will receive joint funding from IFC and the EBRD in the amount of \$435 million to upgrade, expand and improve the quality of telecommunications services in Ukraine. This is the [largest foreign direct investment](#) in the country since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion.

DVL's investments will focus on improving defences against cyber threats and introducing more competitive products and services. The project will also help restore Ukraine's telecommunications sector after it suffered \$1.9 billion in direct damage and \$750 million in losses as a result of Russian aggression.

This kind of investment is also important because, according to the NBU, the exports of IT services in August 2024 fell by 7% to \$507 million. This is \$38 million less than in July, and the lowest figure since the beginning of invasion.

In January-August 2024, the total export revenue of IT services amounted to \$4.3 billion, but the share of computer services in the overall structure of Ukraine's exports of all services was 37% in August, down 1.7 percentage points from July.

One of the reasons for this decline is the need to meet mobilisation needs. Therefore, [improving the reservation mechanisms](#) taking into account various aspects and economic criteria could improve the employment structure and scale up the Ukrainian IT exports, thus increasing the revenues from taxes and fees. Of course, such a mechanism should prioritise the goals of supporting the Armed Forces, as well as help strengthen the labour market and increase the predictability of doing business.

Let's look at another aspect of the international economic environment. In late October, financial markets strongly reacted to political tensions, with gold hitting a [new high](#) of \$2,730 per ounce. The rise in prices was driven by increased demand for safe havens (with investors looking for safe assets) due to the escalation of the Middle East conflict and Hezbollah's announcement of a more intense struggle with Israel. The market is also affected by the uncertainty surrounding the US presidential election, which increases the attractiveness of non-dollar assets. Another factor is the expectation of monetary policy easing (such as lower interest rates) by major central banks, which usually [supports gold prices](#).

However, the future dynamics of the value of global assets, including gold, remains uncertain, as the Federal Reserve may slow down its monetary policy easing, which could affect the future gold price. These developments will hardly have a significant impact on Ukraine, as the lion's share of the country's FX reserves is denominated in US dollars. Nevertheless, the turbulent situation on global markets may affect the processes of supporting Ukraine.

# V.

## ENERGY SECTOR

In October, Ukraine's integrated power system (IPS) operation was fairly stable. No hourly blackout schedules were applied, while emergency shutdowns were used only for the duration of the drone attacks at nights on 3, 16, 19 and 28 October. The small but persistent energy shortages in some daytime and evening hours were compensated for by supplies from five neighbouring countries. Emergency assistance from the Polish operator was called in seven times, and the capacity of interconnectors was used by no more than a quarter (9.2 GWh on 16 October).

The balance in the system was achieved by bringing the last of the nine NPP units repaired during the off-season back online as planned, launching 0.6 GW of distributed generation, and restoring a third of the thermal capacity damaged by Russian attacks.

During the reporting period, the capacity of Ukraine's IPS was provided by 9 NPPs generating up to 7.1 GW of power. Sources of manoeuvrable power included 6-8 power units of TPPs and CHPPs, as well as HPPs and PSPs, which together generated about 3.8 GW of electricity.

Generation at Ukrhydroenergo facilities increased in October, but did not exceed 0.7 GW. The levels in the Dnipro and Dniester reservoirs were in line with the decision of the Interagency Commission with the State Agency of Water Resources of Ukraine establishing their operating modes. At the same time, deteriorating weather continues to reduce the efficiency of SPPs. As a result, the generation capacity of renewable power plants dropped to 0.7-0.9 GW.

After the early launch of the ninth NPP unit, the generation in Ukraine increased to 11-12 GW every hour (in 2021, it was 18 GW). NPPs accounted for most generation (60%), followed by TPPs (17%), CHPPs (9%), HPPs and renewables (7% each).

Due to hostilities and technical problems, an average of 540 Ukrainian settlements were

without electricity (-20 compared to the previous month), and up to 70 additional settlements were without power due to weather conditions (7 October). The number of communities without power supply for various reasons has decreased for the first time since May.

The key areas in which the central government, oblast military administrations and community authorities «were working in sync» to prepare for the heating season included preparation of infrastructure, accumulation of resources and creation of decentralised generation. The Cabinet of Ministers focused on «nine frontline and border regions», and their needs were met first and foremost.

It was announced that repair works at all nine NPP had been completed ahead of schedule and that the networks and systems were ready to «transport winter electricity». It was also reported that the physical protection of facilities was arranged taking into account the enemy's use of air-launched cruise missiles with cluster warheads, as well as the formation of dispersed reserves of the most vulnerable components at transmission and distribution facilities. According to the CEO of Ukrenergo, «We have a certain stock of key equipment to ensure the stable and reliable operation of the integrated power system of Ukraine».

Ukraine managed to restore one-third of its thermal generation and installed 83 cogeneration units and 239 block-modular boiler houses with a total capacity of 147 and 635 MW, respectively. By the end of the year, 99 more cogeneration units are expected to be operational.

The government stated that «more than 99% of residential buildings, schools, kindergartens and hospitals are ready for the heating season», and 18,000 boiler houses and 4,800 central heating stations are «ready to supply heat». In turn, the Ministry of Social Policy assured that all enterprises, institutions and organisations under its authority «are provided with diesel generators of the required capacity», and «a number of institutions are

ready to work in conditions of a possible shutdown of district heating».

However, these conclusions hardly match the results of inspections of 2.4 thousand energy facilities conducted by the State Inspectorate for Energy Supervision. According to its report, by 24 October 2024, the inspected entities had managed to **eliminate** only 66% of identified violations.

In preparation for the winter of 2024-2025, the Cabinet of Ministers **established** a procedure for providing financial assistance to privileged population groups for the purchase of solid stove fuel; **announced** the allocation of an additional €86 million of the loan from the European Investment Bank «on the construction of protection systems around energy facilities»; **determined** the list of energy equipment and other goods exempt from VAT and import duty when imported into the customs territory of Ukraine within agreements funded by the Energy Community Secretariat. However, in addition to transformers, batteries, hydraulic and gas turbines, heat pumps, steam boilers, spare parts and consumables, the list somehow includes motor petrol and diesel fuel (UKTZED 2710) but does not include liquefied petroleum gas (UKTZED 2711), which is **to be supplied** to meet the needs of household consumers in Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv and Kherson regions.

In turn, the NEURC **simplified** the procedure for connecting floating gas piston and gas turbine power plants to the transmission system for the period of martial law and **defined** special rules for calculating heat production tariffs for licensees using cogeneration plants with a capacity of up to 5 MW (4.3 Gcal/h).

On 29 October, Ukrenergo successfully **concluded negotiations** with ENTSO-E to increase the maximum cross-border capacity from 1.7 to 2.1 GW starting from 1 January 2025. From 1 March 2025, commercial capacity limits will be set by transmission system operators on a monthly basis.

**According to the Ministry of Energy**, «Ukraine has accumulated sufficient reserves of fuels and lubricants to get through the autumn and winter period». **Coal reserves** at TPPs and CHPPs are at their maximum level (3.1 Mt). **Gas reserves** in underground storage facilities amount to 8.2 bcm (+0.6 bcm compared

to September; excluding 4.7 bcm of long-term storage and 0.6 bcm of gas owned by non-residents).

**Naftogaz Ukraine** noted that «gas remains almost the only reliable source of energy in times of war», so «fuel tariffs will not change, and the heating season will start on time». In support of this, Gas Supply Company Naftogaz Trading LLC **reported** to have concluded contracts with 407 district heating companies, 737 condominiums, 4,703 state-funded organisations and 581 religious institutions.

As no shortages of fuel and energy were observed in Ukraine during the reporting period, and all networks and systems were functioning normally, the main discussion focused on the upcoming heating season. Although the **government**, the **Ministry of Energy**, and **Ukrenergo** repeatedly claimed that the coming winter «will be more difficult than the previous one», and one member of the Centrenergo board **even promised** the return of «blackout schedules» if in early November «Ukrenergo fails to maintain the balance of the power system», no official predicted major problems with fuel and energy supplies in the winter of 2024-2025. Moreover, the **Prime Minister**, the **Minister of Energy**, and the **CEO of Ukrenergo** all stated that the only reason for consumption restrictions this winter could be «massive shelling of generation facilities», and «**only temporary emergency shutdowns** due to damage are possible, but they will not be regular».

However, 83 CEOs and top managers, **surveyed** by European Business Association, while having assessed the business readiness for the winter season at 3.84 out of 5, gave miserable 2.0 to the government support for winter preparation. In addition, the new power plants transferred to Ukraine and/or purchased have not yet been launched; the need for cogeneration units has been met only by half; and the low and/or unguaranteed capacity of the equipment is veiled by its large number (16,500 generators, 120,000 batteries) and/or the silent start date (2025).

The debt problem has not yet been resolved. The **draft law No. 11301-d** of 18 July 2024, aimed at improving payment discipline in the electricity market by opening current accounts with a special regime of use, introducing an algorithm for the distribution of funds from

such accounts and strengthening liability for unauthorised electricity withdrawal is still being prepared for the second reading. The [draft law No. 12087](#) of 2 October 2024, which provides for the implementation of the Energy Community acquis in Ukraine, regulates the issues of electricity market coupling, interstate balancing, capacity provision and risk preparedness planning, received [negative feedback](#) from the NSSMC.

In October, the SOE Guaranteed Buyer did not provide information on consumer debts to producers and universal service providers. It is not yet clear whether the lack of such information is a simple delay, or its publication will be stopped altogether, as in the case of other open data. According to unofficial information, both debts have resumed their growth and are estimated at UAH 16 billion and UAH 14 billion, respectively.

With the start of the heating season, the debts of district heating companies for gas consumption, which currently exceed UAH 65 billion, will certainly start to grow.

Ukrenergo's debt to renewable energy generation continues to grow, reaching UAH 29 billion, although the previous management planned to [pay it off](#) in full by the end of the year. At the same time, electricity market participants owe the operator approximately the same amount for transmission and dispatching services

Debts on the balancing electricity market are growing by UAH 0.7-0.8 billion every month. The problem can be solved by ensuring the solvency of all energy market participants, from producers and suppliers to end consumers. However, the matter has not progressed beyond the NSDC's [regular instructions](#) to the Cabinet of Ministers. For reasons unknown, the government is effectively boycotting the [reduction](#) of the list of protected consumers, where critical infrastructure companies make no more than one-third. The latest news regarding the relevant resolution is dated 22 July, when its [draft was submitted](#) to the State Regulatory Service.

Results of the auctions held by Ukrenergo pursuant to the [NEURC resolution](#) were far from the expected ones. Only 33 of 48 companies deposited financial collateral into

escrow accounts. In other words, in a year's time, the power system will have only 99 MW of frequency support reserves (which meets the [demand](#)), 68 MW of [reserves](#) for loading services and 210 MW for loading and unloading services in each hour (12% and 50% of the [demand](#)). It is possible that such behaviour of winning bidders was caused by increased risks following the [dismissal](#) of the CEO of Ukrenergo and the resignation of two independent members of the company's supervisory board. For the same reason, the third auction scheduled for in October has been [postponed](#) to 24 December 2024.

Concerns about the excessive government's interference in corporate governance processes were expressed in a letter from the Energy Community Secretariat about possible restarting of the Ukrenergo certification in case of failure to meet the requirements for unbundling. The NEURC had to [make excuses](#) by assuring the Secretariat that all procedures would take place «in due time and in the prescribed manner».

The IMF Executive Board [approved](#) the fifth review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme, which provides Ukraine with immediate access to \$1.1 billion to support the state budget. However, the mandatory conditions for the next tranche include the formation of Ukrenergo's supervisory board by 31 December 2024 with a majority of independent members and the cancellation of the state registration of the NEURC's regulatory acts. By the end of the year, the Cabinet of Ministers must also explain to creditors the reasons for the emergence and growth of debts at the district heating companies.

For some unknown reason, the government continues to [mislead](#) citizens, state-funded and municipal institutions and organisations by convincing them of the high efficiency of PV panels in autumn and winter and/or in regions with low solar radiation intensity. The availability of government interest-free lending programmes, as well as the Affordable Loans 5-7-9% programme for condominiums and housing cooperatives for the purchase of renewable energy generation equipment and energy storage devices, is exaggerated.

The new management of Ukrenergo [considers](#) the worst-case scenario to be

«the continuation of massive shelling of the transmission network infrastructure, generation facilities, and so on». They claim that «we may have a limitation of electricity capacity on... cold days of up to two blackout groups according to hourly outage schedules... that is, up to eight hours [without power] a day... if we are talking about functioning as is».

So, if we are talking about «as is», then even if we put all nine NPP units into operation, use the maximum cross-border capacity (2.1 GW), restore 3 out of 9 GW of installed capacity of large TPPs and HPPs and additionally install up to 2 GW of new power plants, including gas turbines and cogeneration, the imbalance between generation and consumption at temperatures below minus 5°C will still be between 3 and 5 GW even without Russia's interference.

In addition, Ukraine does not yet have the aforementioned 2 GW of new installed capacity. Indeed, Ukrenergo itself admits that over the past 3-4 months it has issued terms of reference for grid connection for only 1.3 GW of capacity «for everything – from biogas to relatively small wind energy facilities». As for gas piston and gas turbine plants, «the equipment for this one gigawatt has been delivered, but we will not have time to install it and put it into the grid».


Against this backdrop, the other two, more «optimistic» scenarios for the winter, in which «no significant systemic constraints» are expected, look even more dubious. After all, the projected deficit of «120-150 MW with a base

consumption of 16.5 GW in the power system» is only possible if the average air temperature stays above -5°C, the capacity of cross-border crossings is used by more than three quarters (>37 GWh), and imported energy is distributed, including to the Left-bank Ukraine.

Moreover, the October balance (with an average air temperature above +8°C) could only be maintained by imports of up to 9.2 GWh per day, and the initial conditions of grids and systems in the western and frontline regions of Ukraine differ significantly. Therefore, it is unlikely that consumers in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv oblasts, as well as those living in the Kharkiv, Dnipro and Odesa metropolitan areas, will not face «significant systemic constraints» throughout the winter.

During the martial law, access to sensitive information on critical infrastructure facilities should obviously be closed, including «the location, condition and operating modes of energy equipment..., volumes of production, consumption, storage, shipment of resources..., information on the locations of planned repair and restoration works and the process of carrying out such works in real time..., the quantity and quality of supplied and available equipment and the technical capacity of enterprises». But this does not mean that Ukrainian citizens and businesses in each region should be deprived of reliable information about the real risks of the heating season and possible actions to ensure energy autonomy and rational energy consumption.

# VI. CITIZENS' OPINIONS ABOUT CURRENT ISSUES<sup>1</sup>




<sup>1</sup> Results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service on 20-26 September 2024 as part of the Pact's ENGAGE (Enhance Non-Governmental Actions and Grassroots Engagement) programme in Ukraine funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of the survey are the sole responsibility of Pact and its partners and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

The face-to-face survey was conducted in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Kyiv (the survey in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions was only carried out in government-controlled areas not subject to hostilities).

The survey was based on a stratified multi-stage sampling method with random selection at the earlier stages of sampling and a quota method of selecting respondents at the final stage (when respondents were selected based on gender and age quotas). The sample structure reflects the demographic structure of the adult population of the surveyed areas as of the beginning of 2022 (by age, gender, type of settlement).

A total of 2,016 respondents aged 18+ were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. Additional systematic sampling deviations may be caused by the effects of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.



### DO YOU BELIEVE IN UKRAINE'S VICTORY IN ITS WAR AGAINST RUSSIA?

% of respondents

	August 2022	December 2022	February-March 2023	July 2023	December 2023	January 2024	March 2024	June 2024	September 2024
Yes	76.9	78.5	79.6	79.4	63.3	62.3	59.5	53.0	60.0
Rather yes	14.6	14.7	13.6	13.8	24.8	22.5	23.4	26.9	23.0
Rather no	2.9	1.9	2.1	1.6	3.8	5.0	6.4	7.2	6.2
No	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.6	3.5	4.4	5.0	5.2
Hard to say	4.4	3.7	3.3	3.5	6.5	6.7	6.4	7.8	5.6

### WHEN DO YOU THINK VICTORY WILL COME?

% of respondents who believe in Ukraine's victory

	August 2022	February-March 2023	July 2023	January 2024	March 2024	June 2024	September 2024
By the end of this year	31.2	49.9	35.4	19.7	21.9	23.8	19.5
In 1-2 years	34.3	25.9	37.8	39.8	34.5	37.7	39.2
In 3-5 years	7.1	7.4	8.9	14.0	16.7	14.6	14.8
Not earlier than in 5 years	2.1	1.1	1.2	3.2	4.2	4.6	5.4
Probably not in my lifetime	1.7	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.8	1.3	2.0
Other	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.5
Hard to say	23.1	15.0	15.9	21.8	21.3	17.5	18.6

<b>WHAT SITUATION WOULD YOU PERSONALLY CONSIDER A VICTORY IN THE WAR?</b>									
% of respondents who believe in Ukraine's victory									
	August 2022	September-October 2022	December 2022	February-March 2023	July 2023	January 2024	March 2024	June 2024	September 2024
Stopping the war even if the russian army holds on to the territories occupied after 24 February 2022 (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donbas)	3.1	6.0	3.3	4.6	5.2	3.6	6.2	7.7	8.1
Driving russian troops behind the 23 February 2022 line (ORDLO and Crimea remain occupied)	7.4	8.1	6.2	4.6	9.0	13.0	10.7	13.8	16.6
Driving russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine except for the occupied Crimea	8.7	4.2	8.0	4.4	5.7	7.4	8.6	7.7	7.5
Driving russian troops from the entire territory of Ukraine and restoring borders as of January 2014	54.7	43.9	54.1	46.9	52.6	38.1	45.5	41.8	37.8
Destroying the russian army and promoting insurgency/disintegration within Russia	20.4	26.6	22.4	30.8	20.8	27.3	23.1	17.5	17.5
Other	0.4	0.9	0.3	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.6	2.0	1.5
Hard to say	5.3	10.4	5.6	7.6	5.5	9.1	4.3	9.5	11.1

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