



Razumkov
centre

CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DURING THE UKRAINE WAR



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CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DURING THE UKRAINE WAR

The author's team:

Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI, Director, Military Programmes

Oleksiy MELNYK, Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes

Andriy BYCHENKO, Director, Sociological Service

Danylo DOBROVOLSKYI, Sociology Field Coordinator

Leonid POLYAKOV, Advisor to NISS Director

Oksana MARKEIEVA, Head of the Division for State and Public Safety at the NISS Centre for Security Studies Depart

Yuriy LASHKAY, a representative of the Territorial Defence Forces Staff department for the organisation of voluntary formations and preparation of the population for national resistance

Viktor ZAMIATIN, a representative of the Territorial Defence Forces Staff department for the organisation of voluntary formations and preparation of the population for national resistance

This publication by the Razumkov Centre presents the findings of a research project of the same name supported by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung in Ukraine. It provides an analysis of foreign practices in civil protection and civil-military co-operation with a focus on their relevance to Ukraine, presents a brief assessment of adequacy of Ukraine's current capabilities in this area, and offers general recommendations for improvement. Additionally, it includes the results of a survey among representatives of local authorities and self-government bodies on the cooperation between the state and territorial communities in protecting the population in times of fighting.

The publication is intended to benefit various audiences, including relevant state and local officials, academics, security experts at the state and local level, students, and individuals with an interest in these topics.

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CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DURING THE UKRAINE WAR

Protection of civilians in war becomes an increasingly pressing issue due to the spread of violence and conflict around the world. In 2022, 56 countries were affected by armed conflicts, killing 147,609 people.¹ The UN estimates that 100 civilians die in conflicts every day.

Protection of civilians is a key aspect of warfare, an ethical and strategic imperative in armed conflicts where the enemy uses tactics to harm civilian population.

According to the UN, since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine and as of 21 November 2023,² at least 10,000 civilians have been killed, including more than 560 children; more than 18,500 have been injured; more than 13.5 million Ukrainians (including 3.5 million children) were forced to leave their homes; about 6 million are refugees, 8 million are internally displaced, and 11,000 Ukrainian civilians are missing. Many of the dead and injured were tortured and sexually abused by the Russian invaders. Civilians' homes, residential areas, and social infrastructure have become targets for Russian massive artillery, bomb, drone, and missile strikes. All this suggests that Russia is committing genocide against the Ukrainian people.

Under these circumstances, protection of civilians in general and civil-military co-operation in particular are especially relevant for Ukraine. These issues are addressed at both the national and local levels, involving relevant government services, law enforcement agencies, territorial communities, and civil society organisations. Studying the best foreign practices plays an important role in these activities.

¹ Gowan R. 'Trends in armed conflict', SIPRI Yearbook 2023, chapter 2.

² The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: Civilian deaths in Ukraine top 10,000. 21 November 2023, <https://ukraine.un.org/en/253322-civilian-deaths-ukraine-war-top-10000-un-says>.

Since 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other law enforcement agencies, and the state as a whole have gained their own civil-military co-operation experience in protection the civilian population during war. The creative use of this experience is critical for Ukraine itself and may also be useful for its foreign partners.

This report focuses primarily on the protection of civilians and the role of civilian co-operation of both the Armed Forces and state civil protection services.


PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

Definitions

Internationally, the legal basis for protection of civilians in times of war is the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) and its Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.*



Protection of civilians is a system of measures and actions (a system of governing bodies, forces and means) aimed at preventing emergencies, organising evacuation and rescue operations, protecting the population from the consequences of emergencies (mainly natural and man-made), providing assistance to victims, ensuring efficient use of resources and preparing the population.



If the protection system is aimed at preventing, responding to and eliminating the consequences of a wider range of threats, including **military**, and is positioned to functioning in the conditions of special period of **martial law**, it is usually called **civil defence (CD)**.

* Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_154#Text; Protocol Additional I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_199#Text; Protocol Additional II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_200#Text.



Ukraine has established the Unified Civil Protection system, which covers all types of emergencies (including military) but is not fully oriented to functioning under martial law**.



Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) is the activity of the armed forces aimed at interacting with the civilian environment to create favourable conditions for the fulfilment of certain tasks using military and non-military forces and means.

The CIMIC priority in the operations of the armed forces is military goals and objectives in compliance with the requirements of international humanitarian law and taking into account the need to protect civilians, support the activities of state authorities, support functioning of industrial, municipal and social infrastructure, establish interaction with the civilian environment as a condition for ensuring confidence in the military and effective use of local resources in the operations of the armed forces.



The Ukrainian Doctrine on Civil-Military Co-operation defines its purpose as creating favourable conditions in the civilian environment to achieve military objectives by organising and maintaining an appropriate level of civil-military interaction with civilian objects in the areas of assigned tasks (deployment) of units and subunits of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces***.

** Code of Civil Protection of Ukraine, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5403-17#Text>.

***Doctrine of Civil-Military Co-operation, visit <https://www.ukrmilitary.com/p/library-divers.html>.

1. BEST FOREIGN PRACTICES OF BUILDING A CIVIL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

For Ukraine, it is most expedient to study the experience of countries whose civil protection systems are built to withstand circumstances specific to the Russia-Ukraine war, namely massive use of weapons, including high-powered weapons; air strikes on the entire territory of the country; transformation of indiscriminate use of weapons into their targeted use against civilian objects; and actions of sabotage, intelligence and terrorist groups throughout the country.

In addition to other countries' experience in protection of the civilians, it is important for Ukraine to take into account the CIMIC standards in view of Ukraine's integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic collective security systems.



ISRAEL



Israel's key national security factor is the country's geographical location. Most residential areas and critical infrastructure are located within a narrow coastal strip, which is under constant threat from various types of missiles capable of causing significant damage to vital facilities and civilian population. Currently, the main threats come from Iran and its proxies – the armed groups of Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemeni Houthis.



During the unprecedented Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, at least 1,200 people were killed in the first three days, including 800 civilians; more than 3,300 were injured, and 242 people, including more than 120 civilians, were taken prisoner. Almost all casualties were caused by the actions of Palestinian militants rather than by missile attacks. On the one hand, this confirms the overall reliability of the system of protecting the population from air strikes, but on the other hand, this reveals mistakes made by Israeli intelligence, military and political leadership in preparing the country for a massive ground attack. Under these circumstances, the least affected were the communities that could take on the defence of their settlements.¹

Israeli security policy is implemented at both the national and local levels with a clear division of powers and responsibilities. The central government is responsible for the formation and realisation of the national security's strategic directions and basic principles, while local authorities are responsible for the security of their territories. The main task of the latter is to create local defence borderlines and checkpoints with all the necessary infrastructure, as well as to develop mechanisms for deploying territorial defence forces and protecting the population. Accordingly, the population has an understanding that local authorities are obliged not only to address economic issues in settlements, but also to maintain their defence capability, ensure the maintenance of critical and social infrastructure, and protect people.²

Coordination of the civilian population's security in Israel is entrusted to the military administration called the Home Front Command, which acts as a single coordination centre. Its tasks include alerting people about of

¹ 'Israel revises Hamas attack death toll to around 1,200', Reuters, November 10, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-revises-death-toll-oct-7-hamas-attack-around-1200-2023-11-10>. Between 2,500 and 5,000 missiles were fired from Gaza, killing at least five people. 'Israel and Hamas at war after surprise attacks from Gaza Strip'. The Guardian, 7 Oct. 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/07/hamas-launches-surprise-attack-on-israel-as-palestinian-gunmen-reported-in-south>; «Everyone approaching the fence was killed»: how kibbutz residents in Israel repelled an attack by Hamas militants on their own, TSN, 13 October 2023, <https://tsn.ua/svit/vbivali-vsih-hto-pidhodiv-do-parkanu-yak-zhiteli-kibucu-v-izrayili-samostiyno-vidbili-ataku-boyovikiv-hamas-2429053.html>.

² See, in particular «Israel's experience in forming a national security strategy», NISS, 17 June 2022, <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/natsionalna-bezpeka/dosvid-izrayilyu-shchodo-formuvannya-stratehiy-natsionalnoy>; O.Vyshniakov, «'New Israel': How to protect the population in the context of a protracted war», Interfax, 16 May 2022, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/blog/832621.html>.



danger; coordinating activities of rescue services; and participating in the elimination of the consequences of natural, man-made and military disasters. The engineering, fire and rescue units subordinated to the Command work in direct co-operation with local authorities and communities, which ensures a high level of efficiency and effectiveness of civil protection.

Settlements run the systems of permanent and makeshift bomb shelters. Each house is equipped with either its own underground bomb shelter or a «safe room», which is the responsibility of the house owners. The networks of public and makeshift shelters and bomb shelters are maintained by local authorities. Almost 100% of Israel's adult population is covered by war and emergency preparedness.



GERMANY³



In Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for civil protection. Relevant Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance and the Directorate-General for Crisis Management and Civil Protection have been established within its structure. The Ministry coordinates the actions of 16 land governments, local governments, institutions and organisations to protect the population and territories in emergency situations.

At the state and local levels, the key tasks in the event of crises and emergencies fall within the responsibility of the land governments and are carried out by the land ministries of interior and civil protection. Under martial law and during exercises, these agencies are staffed by the relevant services and become district (land) headquarters that deal with all civil protection measures in their area of responsibility. All 16 land governments have secure command posts. Civil protection chiefs are appointed in districts, cities, and municipalities, and their headquarters are deployed in the event of an emergency.

³ L.Klos, O.Ivaniv, Peculiarities of the functioning of the civil protection system in Germany. Bulletin of Lviv State University of Life Safety, 2 March 2021, <https://journal.ldubgd.edu.ua/index.php/Visnuk/article/view/2204/2098>.



Units of the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) form the basis of numerous trained voluntary civil defences. They are staffed by volunteers who are obliged to work in this service for 10 years, provided they are exempt from military service. The size of BBK at its full deployment reaches 600 thousand persons. The basic tactical unit is a platoon, while companies and battalions (detachments) can be created when necessary. The number of civil protection units subordinated to the district or community leadership depends on the peculiarities of industrial zones (districts, enterprises), population, the nature of the built-up area, and the physical, geographical and climatic conditions of the region. In the administrative centres of Germany, civil protection units and services are created based on the number of people:

- ✓ one rescue platoon per 40-50 thousand;
- ✓ one firefighting platoon per 30-40 thousand;
- ✓ one water supply platoon per 400-500 thousand;
- ✓ one platoon for protection against weapons of mass destruction per 250 thousand;
- ✓ one platoon of medical and sanitary assistance per 40-50 thousand;
- ✓ one repair platoon per 200 thousand;
- ✓ one public service platoon per 250 thousand.

Inter-district units with a total strength of up to 40,000 people have been set up in 100 districts that are potential nuclear strike targets. Units of up to 100,000 people are deployed in large settlements. BBK also has more than 11,000 transport and special vehicles and other equipment.

An important role is played by the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), whose main tasks include rescue, repair and restoration works in case of accidents in the electricity, gas, water and sewage systems; restoration of communication routes and road facilities; and provision of technical assistance to communities and people in the aftermath of natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes. THW land authorities manage more than 600 local offices. THW employs 75,000 volunteer rescuers who are unpaid.



Only the management staff (over 900 people) are paid professionals, while all the machinery, equipment, and sites are provided by the state.

The fire service has three types of units: full-time fire brigades (100 professional units with 27,600 firefighters); voluntary fire teams (25,000 voluntary units plus 261,000 young firefighters aged 10-17); and special purpose units (900 object fire brigades with 30,000 firefighters).

Citizens' participation in voluntary firefighting units is stimulated by the following social guarantees and benefits:

- ✓ exemption from military service upon completion of 6 years of service in a voluntary fire service;
- ✓ insurance in case of death, injury or disability;
- ✓ inclusion of service in a voluntary unit in the total length of service for pension purposes;
- ✓ payment of salary at the main place of work for the time spent in operational work and for the 10-week training period;
- ✓ full or partial remuneration of management and key technical personnel (drivers, engineers, mechanics);
- ✓ moral incentives in the form of awards (for 25 years of impeccable service, for special merits, for 40 years of impeccable service), insignia, public gratitude; payment for membership in specialised clubs;
- ✓ free equipment and meals for the period of service in a voluntary unit.

Volunteering has traditionally been widely used in the country's civil protection system. In total, 1.7 million volunteers work in this system, including 1.3 million employed by the fire service. Emergency self-defence units have also been set up across the country, under the overall management of THW; more than 400 branches provide training for the population at their place of residence.

Charitable foundations and organisations, the police, and border guards are also involved in civil protection activities. Bundeswehr units can only be involved with the permission of the Minister of Defence.



Despite having a fairly strong civil protection system, Germany is taking steps to reassess and strengthen it in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war.⁴ The government considers upgrading public underground shelter systems (underground car parks, metro stations and basements) and increases spending on civil protection, including €88 million to the lands to upgrade the warning system. The country also increases its crisis stocks, including medical equipment, protective clothing and medicines. In addition, the German government is considering the possibility of purchasing a missile defence system from Israel or the United States, including to protect against threats from Russia.



FRANCE⁵



Civil protection in France is considered an integral part of civil defence and national security. The overall management of civil defence is carried out by the Ministry of Interior, while the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Crisis Management is responsible for direct activities. Civil defence units are organised into a corps consisting of emergency rescue units and subdivisions; training and mobilisation centres; wartime mobile columns; special units for receiving and accommodating evacuees and victims; an aviation group; and a demining service.

In peacetime, the corps' units are staffed at reduced levels. The personnel required for manning the corps are in the reserve of the Minister of Defence and are allocated at the request of the Minister of Interior. Conscription to the corps is similar to that of military service. The principle of manning in peacetime is mixed, as persons of conscription age liable for military service may also serve along with volunteers. Emergency rescue units operate on the basis of units and subdivisions of the fire service and include 220,000 volunteers (80%), 12,000 professionals (15%), and

⁴ 'Ukraine war pushes Germany to strengthen its bunker infrastructure', Reuters, April 9, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-pushes-germany-strengthen-its-bunker-infra-structure-2022-04-09/>.

⁵ I.Ivanchenko, Foreign experience in organization of the civil protection system, its organizing-economic component, Investment: Practice and Experience, No. 23/2015, http://www.investplan.com.ua/pdf/23_2015/33.pdf.



7,000 military firefighters (the Paris Fire Brigade and the Marseille Naval Fire Battalion). Almost all firefighters are members of the National Federation of Firefighters of France. The activities of fire brigades in France are aimed not only at preventing and extinguishing fires, but also at eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and providing assistance in all emergency situations.

At the departments (regional) level, prefects are responsible for civil defence. The prefect's working body is the secretariat (headquarters in wartime) for civil defence. Mayors are responsible for organising civil defence in cities and communities. In settlements with more than 3,000 inhabitants, advisory commissions (headquarters) are established, headed by an appointed civil defence chief.

Emergency rescue and other urgent work to eliminate the consequences of emergencies may involve military units, as well as fire, police, medical, sapper and other special units. The latter include, in particular, the Operational Coordination Centre, which is on 24/7 duty to monitor the entire territory of France and to inform about the situation.

Emergency rescue and other urgent work to eliminate the consequences of emergencies is usually financed from the state budget. At the same time, a significant amount of civil protection work is carried out by volunteers, funded by local budgets and private funds.

State support and incentives for citizens' participation in volunteer fire brigades are legislated at the national level and implemented at the municipal level, with the size of benefits and social guarantees being set by local governments. Such incentives include:

- ✓ a pension supplement ranging from €450 to €1,000 per year for 20 years of service in voluntary units; and €1,800 per year for 35+ years;
- ✓ payment for volunteers' participation in special operations (including firefighting): €10.5/hour for heads; €7.5/hour for unit commanders; and €6.7/hour for firefighters;
- ✓ payment of salary at the main place of work for the time spent on operational work;



- ✓ free uniforms and meals during the period of service;
- ✓ provision of holidays at any time;
- ✓ insurance for members of volunteer fire brigades;
- ✓ coverage of expenses for annual medical check-ups.



POLAND



The Republic of Poland has established interconnected systems of territorial defence⁶ and civil defence.⁷

To ensure state functions in civil protection, the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration includes the National Fire Service, civil defence (Bureau for Public Protection and Civil Defence), search and rescue teams (Department of Rescue Coordination and Civil Protection) and others. Civil protection measures are carried out by the Government Centre for Security (RCB), which operates a unified communication and warning system. In 2000, the Fire and Rescue Services were merged. Since 2002, the State Fire Service was given additional functions of water rescue and elimination of chemical pollution on land and water. The Chief Commandant of the State Fire Service also acts as the Chief of the National Civil Defence. At the same time, the state has not provided him with any legal, organisational or financial instruments to carry out his main tasks.

⁶ Total Defence: Polish approach to the problem, NISS, 1 April 2020, <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/totalna-oborona-polskiy-pidkhid-do-problemi>; Polish Territories Defence Forces: issues of effectiveness, Military Portal, 21 August 2020, <https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/vijska-terytorialnoyi-oborony-polshhi-pytannya-efektyvnosti>; Russia's attack on Ukraine accelerated the creation of territorial defences, ArmyInform, 16 June 2022, <https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/06/16/napad-rosiyi-na-ukrayinu-pryshvydshyv-stvorenniya-teroborony-v-polshhi/>.

⁷ Foreign experience in organisation of the civil protection system, its organising-economic component, Investment: Practice and Experience, No. 23/2015, http://www.investplan.com.ua/pdf/23_2015/33.pdf.



The control of fire and rescue systems and coordination of their activities are entrusted to rescue control centres at the voivodship fire brigades. Major accident response headquarters have also been set up at the fire brigades. Voivode is the head of headquarters. Fire and rescue services are financed by the state, voivodships, counties, and private entrepreneurs. Training and retraining are provided at the expense of the trainees.

Voluntary fire brigades, united in the Association of Voluntary Fire Brigades, play a significant role in the civil defence system. The said Association comprises 16,380 voluntary fire brigades with more than 700,000 members. Volunteers are remunerated in the amount of PLN 10-15/hour (36-54% of the minimum hourly wage in Poland) for their participation in firefighting and other crisis situations, as well as for participating in tactical exercises.

Volunteer fire brigades are financed from the following sources:

- ✓ 60-70% of the funds for the annual maintenance of voluntary teams (fuel, protective clothing and equipment, minor repairs of buildings and equipment, utilities, rewards for firefighting and participation in training, etc.) come from the budget of local executive bodies;
- ✓ additionally, each rural fire brigade receives about 2% from the district budget, 1.8% from the regional budget, and 6% from the budget of the Association of Voluntary Fire Brigades;
- ✓ about 4% comes from the Environmental Protection Fund;
- ✓ insurance companies may allocate 6% and more of their income to the development of voluntary and state fire protection, but usually allocate much more;
- ✓ 10% of the funding of volunteer teams comes from their own funds – as contributions from members of local branches of the Association (10-30 PLN per year).



In addition, volunteer teams may receive funds in the form of charitable (sponsorship) assistance; also, every individual and every legal entity in Poland has the right to transfer 1% of their annual tax to the development of any public organisation, including the volunteer fire brigade. Also, the Association branches actively use the capacities of local communities to attract grants from various European funds, which are then used to purchase vehicles, repair and build depots, purchase equipment, hold public events, etc. Local budgets are the main source of funding for the purchase of vehicles and expensive rescue equipment for volunteer fire brigades.

Employees of the civil defence services have pension benefits, the right to free medical care, better conditions for leaves, subsidies for recreation, travel, housing, annual and anniversary bonuses, etc.

In 2018, the Polish Supreme Audit Office inspected crisis management and civil protection plans in several voivodeships for the period 2015-2018 and concluded that the civil protection system in Poland was not working properly: «None of the reviewed 20 crisis management plans was properly and fully prepared. Most of them were developed to meet a formal requirement stemming from the law, but their goal was not creating functional means to manage processes in crises». The governments of individual communes do not allocate enough funds for the civil protection system. In many cases, rescue equipment is outdated. Protective structures are designed for less than 3.5% of the population. The public has virtually no knowledge of possible evacuation routes in case of bombing or chemical contamination. Following the audit, the Supreme Audit Office recommended the crisis management and civil defence systems to be merged.⁸

⁸ Poland's civil protection system is not effective, Ukrainian-Polish Media Platform, 21 January 2019, <https://upmp.news/ua-in-polish/sistema-tsivilnogo-zahistu-v-polshhi-ne-ye-efektivnoyu>.



EXPERIENCE OF CIVIL PROTECTION AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO AND IN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES

Protection of civilians has been, is and will continue to be a key aspect, ethical and strategic imperative in planning, conducting and evaluating of NATO military missions (operations). The framework for addressing this issue is set out in documents such as the NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians (2016) and the Protection of Civilians Allied Command Operations Handbook (2020).⁹ These documents were based mainly on the experience of anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. It is hoped that at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, DC, they will be further developed in the light of the experience of the Russia-Ukraine war and Israel's military operations against Hamas in 2023.

The main role in the protection of civilians during NATO operations is played by the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. It has four planning groups in eight areas of activity:

The Civil Protection Group:

- ✓ civil protection and disaster response.

The Transport Group:

- ✓ civil aviation;
- ✓ maritime transport;
- ✓ inland surface transport.

⁹ NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm; The Protection of Civilians Allied Command Operations Handbook, <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2021/the-protection-of-civilians-allied-command-operations-handbook>.



The Joint Health, Food and Agriculture Planning Group:

- ✓ health care;
- ✓ food and agriculture planning.

The Civil Communications Planning Group:

- ✓ industrial resources;
- ✓ civilian communication.

Since 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) has been operating within the Committee tasked to ensure information exchange and coordinate disaster relief efforts among the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). A focal points network has been set up in the EAPC countries to ensure a more rapid response. Emergency response specialists work in EADRCC both full-time and as part of voluntary contributions from participating states (specialists seconded to EADRCC are supported by the participating state). EADRCC coordinates its activities with the relevant UN structures.

Ukraine is also represented and actively participates in the work of the above-mentioned NATO bodies; it has repeatedly received assistance and provided its own forces and means during operations to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes in other countries.

12 March 2014, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee held an emergency meeting with Ukraine, discussing the ways to provide assistance to Ukraine in the event of a civil emergency and reviewing the issue of critical infrastructure security in the event of escalation by Russia. The Committee unanimously reaffirmed its readiness to respond promptly to Ukraine's requests for advisory and logistical assistance.

At the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, the participants agreed upon a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Its purpose is to consolidate and strengthen NATO's assistance to Ukraine in building its resilience, ensuring security and implementing necessary reforms. The package includes humanitarian demining and medical rehabilitation for wounded soldiers, among other projects.



Since the outbreak of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, NATO has played a key role in coordinating military, financial and humanitarian assistance from its member states. In early February 2023, NATO's total military, humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine, according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, amounted to \$120 billion.¹⁰

Another important mechanism aimed at providing assistance to the civilian population during NATO missions (operations) is **civil-military co-operation (CIMIC)**.¹¹ The NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (MC 411, 1997), the NATO Military Committee Directive (MC 411/1, 2001), and the NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-9, 2003) were the first documents in this area defining CIMIC as a military structure tasked to support civilian authorities, local populations, governmental and international organisations to ensure the successful execution of tasks when troops are employed in international peace and security operations. The CIMIC structures cover the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

In any operation under NATO auspices, CIMIC comply with the following principles:

- ✓ prioritising military aims and objectives;
- ✓ maintaining the system of command and control of troops at all levels;
- ✓ ensuring minimal use of military resources while maximising the use of civilian resources (avoiding the depletion of civilian resources in order to prevent negative impact on the livelihoods of the local population);
- ✓ focusing resources on priority projects;
- ✓ following military humanitarian obligations (compliance with obligations under international law).

¹⁰ Secretary General in Washington: NATO Allies are united like never before, 08 Feb. 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211560.htm.

¹¹ I.R.Chobit, «Historical experience of the world's leading countries in introducing and functioning of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) structures, Military Scientific Bulletin, No. 31, 2019, <http://vnu.asv.gov.ua/article/view/169133/168895>.



The following principles are additionally applicable to CIMIC in «non-military operations» (peacekeeping):

- ✓ defining common goals and objectives for military and civilian participants in the operation;
- ✓ defining joint responsibilities and allocating responsibility for successful/unsuccessful activities between military and civilian structures;
- ✓ establishing a clear system of communication and coordination between military and civilian actors;
- ✓ ensuring transparency of actions;
- ✓ understanding the local culture.

Subsequently, in 2013, an updated Doctrine (AJP-3.4.9)¹² was adopted, taking into account the new experience in resolving armed conflicts. It defines general provisions on humanitarian assistance and development:

- ✓ the goals of humanitarian assistance and development that are to work together to contribute to improving the quality of human life;
- ✓ non-discrimination in aid provision – solely on the basis of identified needs, regardless of location, ethnicity, gender, social status or religion;
- ✓ respect for human dignity, principles and norms of international law, including respect for the culture, religion and customs of the local population;
- ✓ transparency and accountability of assistance, absence of corruption, theft and abuse of power;
- ✓ resilience and preparedness, which consist of measures taken in accordance with local conditions and aimed at building up local resources by strengthening civil society and local governments;
- ✓ coordination with local government and stakeholders at every level.

¹² AJP-3.4.9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5bf12ef5e5274a2b030d7d5a/20181112-dcdc_doctrine_nato_cimic_ajp_3_19.pdf.



The national CIMIC of NATO member states are based on and developed in line with their own national legislation, internal strategic guidelines and NATO Doctrine. At the same time, while CIMIC activities in most NATO members are focused on operations outside their respective countries, Germany and the Netherlands also use CIMIC mechanisms on their territories during operations related to national security and response to natural disasters, accidents and catastrophes.



EU CIVIL PROTECTION MECHANISM

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism is one of the main European structures for effective response to natural and man-made disasters, elimination of their consequences, interaction of civil protection authorities and forces with power structures within each state and establishment of co-operation with similar structures of foreign countries.¹³ It was created to improve the systems for preventing, preparing forces and responding to natural and man-made disasters, and to support and coordinate the actions of EU Member States in the field of civil protection. The mechanism is a key instrument of Europe's civil protection and the world's most powerful system for providing international coordinated emergency assistance. It consists of 36 members (27 EU Member States plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, and Montenegro).

The Mechanism's peculiarity is its transition from responding to possible emergencies to ensuring the resilience of a particular state in crisis and strengthening the interaction of civil protection forces and authorities with the armed forces and other power structures. It stipulates that civil

¹³ The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism, Environmental Emergencies Centre, <https://eecentre.org/partners/the-european-union-civil-protection-mechanism>; N.H.Klymenko, «The essence of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and prospects for Ukraine's full membership in it», Public governance, No. 5 (33), 2022, <http://journals.maup.com.ua/index.php/public-management/article/view/2555/3018>; V.Demchuk, Reforming the civil protection sector as a security space component in the context of Ukraine's European integration, Scientific bulleting «Public administration», No. 1 (13), 2023, <https://nvdu.undicz.org.ua/index.php/nvdu/article/view/294/268>.



protection and other emergency assistance may be required in addition to the response measures by the affected country itself. In case of disasters caused by terrorist acts, nuclear or radiological accidents, the Mechanism only provides for civil protection preparedness and response.

The Mechanism consists of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, the European Civil Protection Pool as a voluntary pool of Member State's pre-defined capacities, specialised civilian civil protection units with appropriate equipment, trained experts, a common emergency communications and information system and focal points in Member States.

The Mechanism defines three basic areas of civil protection measures:

- ✓ training of personnel for emergency response services that deal with the consequences of emergencies;
- ✓ organising and coordinating co-operation between relevant services of different EU Member States in responding to emergencies and eliminating their consequences;
- ✓ providing assistance to a particular EU Member State with the forces and resources of the reserve funds in preventing and responding to emergencies.

The Mechanism also promotes a culture of prevention and improved co-operation between civil protection and other relevant services, as well as of rapid and effective response to disasters. Regional and local authorities should be appropriately involved in disaster management measures undertaken by Member States' national bodies. The Mechanism does not rule out the possibility of using military means under civilian leadership as a last resort in disaster response.

The urgent activation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism with the outbreak of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war created conditions for meeting the basic needs of those affected and improved the capacity of the Ukrainian authorities to respond adequately to crises related to the provision of humanitarian assistance to a large part of the population and the restoration of the country's life support systems.

Since the onset of the Russian aggression, as of April 2023, the EU has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine totalling €685 million, including



€55 million provided on 20 April 2023. During this time, more than 88,000 tonnes of vital food, medicines and equipment have been sent to Ukraine to mitigate the effects of aggression. Before the winter cold, the EU financed the delivery of more than 1,000 power generators from the EU's strategic energy reserves to Ukraine.

On 20 April, Ukraine became a member state of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism by signing a relevant agreement.¹⁴

CONCLUSIONS

Civil protection and CIMIC systems have a clear division of powers and responsibilities at all levels for planning and decision-making, organising and coordinating actions, creating, ensuring and maintaining forces and means on standby alert.

The civil protection and CIMIC systems in some EU and NATO countries are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing. They place considerable emphasis on active participation of civil society, volunteering and decentralisation, with central authorities playing a leading role.

Local authorities and self-governments also play an important part in the systems of ensuring security and resilience of local communities in Western countries.

In view of the difficult international and regional security situation, many countries use an integrated approach to ensuring preparedness and response to a wide range of threats by unifying mechanisms (prevention, response, elimination of consequences) in case of natural, man-made and military emergencies. The issues of protection of the population and resilience of territorial communities are considered in conjunction with other national security aspects.

Training and encouraging people to participate and work effectively in voluntary formations, as well as to join organised actions in case of emergencies of any nature are vital for protecting the population and ensuring resilience at the national and local levels.

¹⁴ Ukraine joined the EU civil protection system, Ukrinform, 20 April 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3698523-ukraina-priednalasa-do-sistemi-civilnogo-zahistu-es.html>.

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
PROTECTING THE POPULATION IS A JOB FOR EVERYONE

The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine notes: «Missile strikes continue to wreak havoc across Ukraine, destroying residential areas, key infrastructure, grain and agricultural facilities, often located far from the frontline. Civilians in the Russian-occupied territories have been subjected to torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence and arbitrary detention. Hundreds of civilians are imprisoned... Over the past six months, the war has claimed an average of six civilian lives a day... The actual figures are likely higher».¹

Recovery from the Russian troops' presence in the temporarily occupied and later liberated settlements, constant artillery, bomb and rocket attacks on frontline villages and cities, and periodic missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure across Ukraine involves efforts of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SES), the National Guard, the National Police, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), units of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), volunteer formations of territorial communities (VFTCs) for territorial defence and civil protection, as well as NGOs and volunteers.


At the same time, when implementing measures to prevent threats and eliminate their consequences, a number of shortcomings and problems were identified that prevented escaping large-scale destruction and civilian casualties caused by Russian aggression.

¹ Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. 1 February to 31 July 2023, United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 4 October 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/23-10-04-OHCHR-36th-periodic-report-ukraine-en.pdf>.



* Individual cases verified by OHCHR; actual number are considerably higher.

Source: OHCHR HRMMU 11 September 2023, <https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/Ukraine%20-%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%208%20October%202023%20UKR.pdf>.



* Individual cases verified by OHCHR; actual number are considerably higher.

** Incidents in which civilians were killed or injured by shelling from artillery, tanks and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), by cruise and ballistic (air, sea and land based), and by air strikes, including loitering munitions and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

*** Incidents in which civilians were killed or injured by fire from small arms and light weapons, including as a result of crossfire, sniper fire, escalation of force incidents (cases in which military whom they perceived as a threat), and wilful killings, as well as road accidents involving either military vehicles driven by military in the area of hostilities.

Source: OHCHR HRMMU 11 September 2023, <https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/Ukraine%20-%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%208%20October%202023%20UKR.pdf>.



MAIN THREATS TO CIVILIAN LIFE

Fire damage in the frontline area and occupiers' actions in the occupied territories

Every day, Ukraine's frontline regions are subjected to repeated barbaric fire attacks using cannon and rocket artillery, drones, air bombardments, and S-300 missile attacks. Remote mining of populated areas and agricultural land by Russian troops also results in many casualties. Administrative buildings, transport, energy, water supply, industrial, social infrastructure and residential buildings are targeted, which leads to civilian deaths and injuries.

According to Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs, in just 11 months of 2023, Russian troops shelled Ukrainian settlements 59,000 times, killing 2,000 civilians and injuring 11,000 more. Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts were the most affected.² The highest number of deaths – more than



Photo: GETTYIMAGES.COM

3,900 – was recorded in March 2022, when Russians occupied part of Kyiv oblast and advanced towards the capital. By the end of 2022, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented and confirmed evidence of extrajudicial executions and mass killings of civilians in more than 30 settlements in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Out of the many thousands of war crimes committed by the Russian army against the civilian population of Ukraine, the most horrific were the following:

Kharkiv. On 28 February 2022, the Russian army shelled Kharkiv with Grad MLRS and precision-guided missiles, damaging 87 residential buildings and killing 11 people. More than 40 were injured, including five children. In the first five months of the war, Kharkiv was shelled more than 5,000 times, with more than 1,000 civilians losing their lives.

² MIA: 2,000 civilians killed in Ukraine due to Russian shelling since the beginning of the year. Radio Svoboda, 30 November 2023, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ukraina-obstrily-zahybly/32708811.html>.

Bucha massacre. More than 422 local residents died during the occupation until March 2022. Shooting in the back of the head was the main method of killing. The Russian military demonstrated particular cruelty in the last days of the occupation just before their retreat, executing almost all men between the ages of 18 and 60 who remained in the occupied city.

Mariupol. By 15 March 2022, about 1,800 civilians were confirmed dead during the city's blockade by the Russian occupiers. On 16 March, a bomb destroyed the Drama Theatre, which was used by the locals as a bomb shelter. At the time of the bombing, between 500 and 1,200 civilians were hiding there. According to various estimates, 300 to 600 people could have been killed. According to local authorities, the true total number of deaths during the siege of Mariupol may be closer to 20,000.

Kramatorsk. A missile attack on the railway station on 8 April 2022 killed 61 people (including five children) and injured 114. At that moment, thousands of people gathered at the station trying to evacuate.



Izium. After the de-occupation on 15 September 2022, about 450 fresh graves were discovered in the town. Most of the dead were civilians, including children.

Dnipro. On 14 January 2023, the Russian army launched a missile attack on the city of Dnipro. One of the missiles hit an apartment building, destroying 72 apartments. According to the regional military administration, 46 people died and 80 were injured by the attack.

Hroza village, Kharkiv oblast. A missile strike on 5 October 2023 killed 59 people.

All that can be added to the above is that the number of such incidents and victims are increasing every day. As of November 2023, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have documented more than 101,000 war crimes committed by the Russian military. In addition to shelling, these crimes



include deportations and illegal detentions, extrajudicial (also mass) executions, torture, and sexual violence.³

In the settlements under temporary occupation, there are instances of untreated industrial water being supplied to users without disinfection, which may contain pathogenic viruses and bacteria and potentially lead to the emergence and spread of various infectious diseases. In the frontline areas of Ukraine, the work of emergency and rescue teams is complicated or impossible due to constant shelling. Russian troops often use the «two-wave» tactic when shelling populated areas, targeting infrastructure facilities in the first wave, and then targeting rescuers who arrive to eliminate the consequences of the attack. As of September 2023, 80 employees of the State Emergency Service (SES) have been killed and 287 others injured during the war.⁴

MISSILE ATTACKS ON UKRAINE


Since day one of the large-scale war, Russia has been launching massive missile and drone strikes across Ukraine. From 24 February 2022 to October 2023, Russia fired in total 3,081 missiles worth \$22.8 billion.⁵

The toughest period coincided with Ukraine's energy system switching to the heating season. Between October 2022 and March 2023, Russia made almost 5,000 missile and 3,500 air strikes and launched more than 1,100 drones on Ukraine. At that time, 50% of Ukraine's energy system was damaged, in addition to more than 3,500 educational institutions, 420 large and medium-sized enterprises, 18 airports and civilian airfields,

³ Torture to death and rape of girls and grandmothers: UN releases report on Russian crimes in Ukraine, 25 September 2023, <https://fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/20230925-tortury-do-smerti-ta-zgvaltvannya-divchat-i-babus-oon-oprylyudnyla-dopovid-pro-zlochyny-rf-v-ukrayini/>.

⁴ Rescuers had to choose between their own lives and the life of a person: SES tells about the shelling in Pokrovsk, Suspilne, 10 August 2023, <https://suspilne.media/548143-ratuvalnikam-dovodilos-obirati-miz-svoim-zittam-ta-zittam-ludini-u-dsns-rozkazali-pro-obstril-u-pokrovsku>; Ukrainian rescuers demonstrate indestructibility and selflessness to our country and people every day – President, 15 September 2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ukrayinski-ryativniki-shodnya-demonstruyut-nashij-krayini-ta-85629>.

⁵ Russia spent \$22.8 bn on missile strikes on Ukraine..., Forbes, 30 October 2023, <https://forbes.ua/ru/war-in-ukraine/raketi-30102023-16966#>.



The largest of the massive shelling, as of December 5, 2022, <https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/12/05/info-grafika/bezpeka/porivnyannya-ostannix-masovanyx-raketyx-atak-rosiji>.



344 bridges, and more than 25,000 km of roads that were destroyed or damaged.⁶

Starting from March 2023, the intensity of Russian missile attacks has slightly decreased, with the enemy shifting its focus to the infrastructure of Ukraine's Black Sea ports in order to prevent the transportation of Ukrainian grain by sea. Between April and 13 December 2023, Russia launched about 125 combined strikes against Ukraine, using close to 980 missiles and more than 1,800 drones.⁷

Ukraine is currently expecting the repeated massive missile attacks. As of early December 2023, Russia had accumulated 870 missiles of different types, including «Kinzhal», «Iskander», «Kalibr», X-22, X-101, and X-555.⁸ This means that the threat to Ukraine's energy and civilian infrastructure remains.

If air defences intercept almost all cruise and ballistic missiles and drones over Kyiv and the damage and casualties are mostly caused by the debris of downed air targets, then in other parts of the country said weapons remain rather difficult targets to hit (70% kill probability for missiles and 85% for drones) causing extensive damage and civilian casualties.

Terrain mining

As of October 2023, 174,000 sq.km. of Ukraine's territory is contaminated with mines or unexploded ordnance. Around 6 million people are at risk of being exposed to mines. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Defence (MoD), as of September 2023, 246 civilians have been killed by mines



Photo: SES ILLUSTRATIVE

⁶ What war-affected communities should do: how to start restoring Ukrainian cities and villages, Ukrinform, 29 November 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-vidbudova/3793244-so-robiti-postrazdalim-vid-vijni-gromadam-z-cogo-pocati-vidnovlenna-mist-ta-sil-ukraini.html>.

⁷ Generalised assessment based on operational data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

⁸ Yuriy Ihnat: Russia is not just accumulating missiles – it is restoring its strategic stockpile, RBC-Ukraine, 4 December 2023, <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/yuriy-ignat-rosiya-prosto-nakopichue-raketi-1701621026.html>.

and UXO in Ukraine, including 13 children, and 521 people have been injured, including 53 children. During their retreat, russians are mining communications and critical infrastructure in cities to make it difficult for Ukrainian businesses and local residents to return. In the de-occupied territories, locals regularly come across mines, often resulting in injury or loss of life. One-third of the total territory of Ukraine is potentially dangerous due to mines.⁹

Large-scale emergencies with complex consequences



Flooding of settlements after undermining the dam of the Kakhovka hydroelectric station

On 6 June 2023, russian troops blew up the dam of the Kakhovka HPP, causing the largest environmental disaster in Europe since the Chernobyl nuclear accident. The dam explosion caused an uncontrolled outflow of water from the Kakhovka reservoir, flooding 600 sq.km. The flood zone included 46 settlements with a total population of about 58.5 thousand. As a result of this sabotage, 33 people died and 28 were injured in the government-controlled areas of Ukraine. More than 40 people are still missing. About 880,000 people have lost access to centralised water supply, which poses an immediate threat to their lives and health.

The aggressor's violation of the rules of war increases the risk of radiation hazard in cities and regions with nuclear facilities. In March 2022, the russian invaders seized the nuclear power plant in Enerhodar (Zaporizhzhia NPP, ZNPP). Since then, there has been a constant threat of ZNPP blowing up or a man-made accident due to violation of the facility's operating rules. ZNPP has six reactors and a storage facility with about 18,000 spent fuel assemblies (for reference, in 1986, there were 2,000 fuel assemblies at Chornobyl NPP). As a result

⁹ 246 civilians killed by mines in Ukraine, more than 500 wounded, Ukrinform, 20 September 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3763717-vid-min-v-ukraini-zaginuli-246-civilnih-ponad-500-poranenih.html>; About 6 million people in Ukraine are under threat of mine danger – Shmyhal, Ukrinform, 10 October 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3771776-v-ukraini-blizko-6-miljoniv-osib-znahodatsya-pid-zagrozou-minnoi-nebezpeki-smigal.html>; UN: 69 children injured, 20 killed by mines in Ukraine, Radio Svoboda, 15 June 2023, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ukraina-miny-dity/32460307.html/>.



Russian troops at Zaporizhzhya NPP
Фото: Str./AFP/Getty Images

of possible disaster, the exclusion zone may exceed 30,000 sq.km., turning the Zaporizhzhia region into a territory unsuitable for living and agriculture. The death toll could be in the tens of thousands, with at least two million evacuees. It is safe to say that the consequences of such a catastrophe for the lives and

health of civilians will be felt not only in Ukraine but also far beyond its borders.

Missile and artillery shelling by the aggressor increases the risk of emergencies caused by the destruction of other hydraulic and energy facilities, oil, gas and ammonia pipelines, chemical plants, fertiliser storage facilities and the like. These accidents and disasters can become sources of increased environmental hazards, causing massive direct and indirect civilian casualties.

Fires, accidents, catastrophes

According to operational data, about 169,000 infrastructure facilities were destroyed or damaged by hostilities, including 6,400 life support facilities, more than 1,000 transport infrastructure objects, more than 3,000 educational institutions, nearly 1,300 health facilities, 150,300 residential buildings, 670 administrative buildings, and more than 4,500 other (non-military) facilities.



Fire due to shelling of Kyiv, Photo from SES

Since the onset of the war and as of Q3 2023, SES has recorded more than 134,000 fires that killed about 2,300 people, including 67 children, and injured more than 2,500 people, including 241 children. Material losses from fires exceeded UAH 148 billion.¹⁰

¹⁰ Analytical note on fires and their consequences in Ukraine for 10 months of 2023., <https://idundcz.dsns.gov.ua/upload/1/9/6/4/5/6/2/analytychna-dovidka-pro-pojeyi-102023.pdf>.



RESOURCES AND CHALLENGES

During the war, the most urgent tasks of the functional and territorial subsystems of the Unified Civil Protection System are as follows:

- ✓ conducting educational work with the population to ensure its compliance with safety measures during air raids, detection of explosive objects, etc., as well as monitoring compliance with safety measures;
- ✓ inspecting shelters and protective structures owned by the state, municipal and private entities; undertaking measures to ensure their readiness to receive the appropriate number of people during air raids;
- ✓ evacuating people from the most dangerous areas, especially from the frontline zone;
- ✓ humanitarian demining;
- ✓ extinguishing fires, searching for and rescuing people trapped in the rubble of residential buildings, businesses and shopping centres, etc;
- ✓ providing medical assistance to the affected citizens;
- ✓ taking measures to restore the operation of destroyed or damaged water, electricity, gas and heat supply facilities.

All of these tasks are also inherent in peacetime conditions. The problem is that, first, the scale of these tasks was unforeseen at the beginning of Russian aggression, and second, the attention to keeping the relevant forces and means ready to perform these tasks was insufficient.


Protecting the population from the consequences of the war has become a job for every Ukrainian, as well as for many foreign and international humanitarian organisations. In 2023, 540 humanitarian organisations were involved in the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with



two-thirds being Ukrainian NGOs, almost 120 international NGOs and 10 UN agencies.¹¹

Unpreparedness of the protective facilities

«The vast majority of shelters located in populated areas can be classified as the simplest covers, that is, basements or cellars, other underground structures where people can temporarily stay to reduce the combined damage from munitions and other hazards (basements in apartment buildings and educational institutions, car parks, etc.) Many of these shelters are not equipped with evacuation exits, have no access to water supply and sewage systems, and are not adapted for food storage, not to mention the ability to protect the population in the event of the use of weapons of mass destruction».¹²



* State of shelters in Kiev. Photo: the channel of the Minister of Strategic Industries O.Kamyshin

Over the 30 years of independence, most of the old Soviet protective facilities have not been properly repaired or maintained. With the active support of local authorities, many of them have become the property of businesses, are used for other purposes and have become simply unsuitable for protection of civilians.

According to SES, about 21,000 civil defence facilities were registered in Ukraine in early 2022. 74% of them were evaluated as ready or «partially ready» to be used as shelters, while 26% were not usable at

¹¹ Humanitarian organisations continue to provide assistance to the war-affected population of Ukraine, Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, 4 December 2023, <https://minre.gov.ua/2023/12/04/gumanitarni-organizacziyi-prodovzhuyut-nadavaty-dopomogu-postrazhdalomu-vid-vijny-naselennyu-ukrayiny/>.

¹² Explanatory note to the Draft Law of Ukraine of 29 July 2022 «On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Ensuring Civil Protection Requirements in the Course of Planning and Development of Territories», <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/pubFile/1326317>.

all. It is estimated that only 10% of the population could use these facilities in a crisis. In practice, from day one of the Russian aggression, and especially with the start of massive missile attacks in October 2022, it turned out that many of the registered protective facilities did not provide sufficient protection from shelling, or their condition and arrangements did not meet basic safety and sanitary standards for civilians.¹³

Dual-purpose structures are currently used more or less effectively. These include aboveground or underground structures designed or adapted to protect the public and provide conditions for temporary stay – metro stations, underground pedestrian crossings, car tunnels, underground car parks, etc. However, such engineering structures are not available everywhere, so they cannot meet the needs of the entire settlement.



Shelter in the subway,
Photo UNIAN, M.Hryhorenko

Bomb shelters in the basements of residential buildings, educational institutions, business centres, government and other institutions are usually designed not taking into account the actual number and geographical size of residential areas. Many are not equipped with life support facilities, while many residents, especially in large cities, are unaware of the locations of these bomb shelters.

Air raid alarms often catch people in places far from stationary shelters or bomb shelters – on their way to or from work, in public places, and the like. In this context, the solution could be erecting prefabricated civil defence structures. Unfortunately, state and local authorities began to pay attention to them only after the outbreak of hostilities.



Shelter at the bus stop in Dnipro,
Photo gettyimages

¹³ Shelter: Is it possible to improve the situation during the war?», Deutsche Welle, 26 August 2022, <https://www.dw.com/uk/ukritta-i-bombshovisa-ak-v-ukraini-vipravlaut-pomilki-dovoennogo-casu/a-62923685?maca=ukr-rss-ukrnet-ukr-all-3816-xml>; Self-protection in Practice: Ukrainian Efforts to Avoid Harm During the Russian Invasion, CIVIC, 11 April 2023, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/CIVIC_Ukraine-SelfProtect_ENG.pdf.



In August 2023, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and the Cabinet responded to the lack of protective facilities: «From now on, they (protective facilities) have the strategic status to ensure the protection of the population... During martial law, the construction of protective facilities will be accelerated. During privatisation or alienation, it is prohibited to change the functional purpose of these objects. Unimpeded round-the-clock access to protective facilities shall be ensured, while their condition will be inspected systematically. Local authorities are required to develop accommodation plans for sheltering the population in protective facilities».¹⁴

On 14 August 2023, the Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development (AKA the Ministry for Restoration) has approved the draft of new state building standards «Civil Protection Facilities». It establishes clear requirements for the design and construction of new protective facilities, as well as the reconstruction and overhaul of existing ones. According to new norms, all projects for the reconstruction of residential and public buildings, including schools, hospitals, and kindergartens, must include properly equipped protective facilities.¹⁵

Evacuation and humanitarian aid

Since day one of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the state has called for the evacuation of residents of areas with combat action and the adjacent territories. In early March 2023, the state introduced a procedure for the compulsory evacuation of children under the age of 18 accompanied by one of parents. As of 10 May 2023, about 70,000 people, including more than 8,000 children and more than 3,000 people with reduced mobility, have been evacuated from



Evacuation of persons with limited mobility, AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka

¹⁴ Denys Shmyhal, Prime Minister of Ukraine: «The Government has improved the inventory of civil defence structures pursuant to the NSDC decision», Telegram post, 19 August 2023, https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/5884.

¹⁵ Ministry of Reconstruction: new building standards for civil protection facilities approved, 14 August 2023, <https://mtu.gov.ua/news/34604.html>.



the dangerous areas of Donetsk region in 9 months. Similarly, more than 25,000 people left Kharkiv region, and more than 23,000 people left Kherson region over 8 months.¹⁶ The evacuation was carried out by the state authorities responsible for this activity, local military administrations, units of the State Emergency Service, the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the National Police, international humanitarian organisations and volunteers.

Despite the announced evacuation from the combat zones, it is still slow, as some people, mostly the elderly and persons with disabilities, refuse to leave and some even return. The main reasons for this are as follows:

- ✓ Insufficient and ineffective communication with the population, limited availability of warning means and hotlines.
- ✓ Ineffective coordination in the use of available resources and the lack of an effective information sharing mechanism between government agencies, local governments, international and national NGOs, and other civil society actors.
- ✓ Shortcomings in evacuation planning, zoning of the territory, failures to promptly update on evacuation needs and the actual readiness of forces and means.
- ✓ People's return to the conflict zones due to, among other things, high rental prices in safe areas, problems with employment, poor condition of housing for evacuees, and lack of adequate information about the risk of return.

A significant role in protecting the population from the consequences of hostilities belongs to humanitarian aid. In total, 10 million Ukrainians received assistance from humanitarian organisations in the first 10 months of 2023. During this period, 7.2 million people received medical care, while 4.1 million had their food and livelihood needs met. Another 5.8 million received access to clean water and hygiene products. Over the year, 540 humanitarian organisations were involved in the humanitarian response,

¹⁶ Proposals to change the mechanism of evacuation of civilians during the legal regime of martial law», Group of Influence, 30 January 2023, <https://www.vplyv.org.ua/archives/7733>.



including more than 350 national NGOs, nearly 120 international NGOs and 10 UN agencies.

The following entities are involved in the transportation of humanitarian goods from abroad and through the territory of Ukraine:

- ✓ Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine;
- ✓ State Service of Ukraine for Transport Safety;
- ✓ State Emergency Service of Ukraine;
- ✓ JSC Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways);
- ✓ JSC Ukrposhta (Ukrainian Post);
- ✓ military and state administrations.

From the private sector, the following companies transport humanitarian goods:

- ✓ Nova Poshta LLC;
- ✓ Meest Express LLC.

Volunteer organisations provide a huge amount of humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian aid delivery to Ukraine faced significant complications due to the blocking of checkpoints on the country's borders with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary in early December.¹⁷

While many new CIMIC units were formed in the Armed Forces and other security agencies to help cope with the growing range and scale of civilian protection tasks, the logistics and transportation support failed keep up with growing demand. Only about 20% of the CIMIC units were equipped with vehicles that were officially on the balance of the respective military units that maintained and fuelled them. Another 60% of the CIMIC units were using civilian cars vehicles that had been

¹⁷ Border blocking: SBGS about problematic areas, more than 5,000 trucks in queues, Ukrayinska Pravda, 12 December 2023, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/12/12/7432686>.

donated by volunteer organisations, and the remaining 20% had no vehicles at all.¹⁸

Mine action

In total, 18 certified domestic and foreign mine action operators work in Ukraine, and another 30 are undergoing certification. Non-technical surveys have covered about 50,000 sq.km of Ukraine's territory. Since September 2023, pyrotechnics have additionally surveyed 50,000 hectares of agricultural land, after which 37,000 hectares have been returned to productive use.¹⁹

As of August 2023, the Mine Action Centre at the Ministry of Defence (MoD) surveyed about 156,000 hectares of territory, more than 5,000 facilities, about 8,000 km of roads, 2,900 km of railway tracks, about 8,000 km of power lines, 541 km of pipelines, and defused more than 528,000 explosive devices. Eight organisations (84 groups with a total of 715 deminers) are involved in humanitarian demining, identifying 960 sites with a total area of 140 sq.km, including 74 sq.km of agricultural land, and clearing 13 sq.km of land.²⁰ As of early December 2023, SES units have defused 459,500 explosive devices, including more than 3,000 aircraft bombs. An area of about 111 thousand hectares has been surveyed.²¹



Photo by the Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response

The main problem of the lack of human and technical resources is currently addressed with the help of foreign partners. The mine action

¹⁸ The role of civil-military co-operation in the protection of civilians: The Ukraine experience, CIVIC, October 2023, <https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Co-operation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf>.

¹⁹ The Ministry of Economy presented the draft National Mine Action Strategy to donor countries», Interfax, 8 December 2023, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/952827.html>.

²⁰ ...a meeting of the National Mine Action Authority..., MoD, 18 August 2023, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2023/08/18/obstezheno-155781-ga-teritorij-zneshkodzheno-528081-vibuhonebezpechnih-predmetiv-vidbulosya-zasidannya-nacjonalnogo-organu-z-pitan-protiminnoi-diyalnosti>.

²¹ Since the beginning of the war, pyrotechnics have defused more than 459,000 explosive devices, Ukrinform, 2 December 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3794727-vid-pocatku-vijni-pirotehniko-zneskodili-ponad-459-tisac-vibuhonebezpechnih-predmetiv.html>.



plans for 2024 envisage training of 3,000 to 10,000 specialists and allocating \$250 million for the purchase of special equipment. Foreign donors finance salaries for deminers, training, and the purchase of demining vehicles. Since 24 February 2022, they promised Ukraine more than \$300 million in specialised assistance. The number of sappers is expected to triple by the end of 2023 compared to the beginning of the year and increase the number of mechanised demining vehicles to 99 in 2024. Before the war, Ukraine had just several vehicles of this type.²²

A big amount of mine action work is carried out by NGOs. In particular, since the onset of the large-scale invasion, 130 volunteer mine risk instructors of the Ukrainian Red Cross have conducted more than 4,000 training courses, and as of October 2023, more than 62,000 people, including 26,000 children, have attended them.²³ NGOs-members of the Ukrainian Deminers Association and the Ukrainian Association of Humanitarian Demining Operators are also active.

Today, more than 20 NATO and EU partner countries, as well as Switzerland, provide logistical support and training to the Ukraine security forces' demining units.

SES ensures rapid response and elimination of the consequences of massive shelling of populated areas and critical infrastructure, including oil products storage and production facilities, which made it possible to promptly restore their functioning. Since the onset of the war, SES units have made about 130,000 trips to eliminate the consequences of shelling, extinguished more than 17,000 fires,



²² M.Zhyrokhov. «Mine threat: Ukraine is gradually cleaning its territories from explosive contamination», Mind, 3 October 2023, <https://mind.ua/openmind/20263400-minna-nebezpeka-ukrayina-postupovozvilnyae-vlasni-teritoriyi-vid-vibuhonebezpechnogo-zabrudnennya>; Ukraine will not only demine the land, but also make money on it..., Ekonomichna Pravda, 9 October 2023, <https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2023/10/9/705226>.

²³ Mine risk education is one of the important areas of work of the URCS, Ukrainian Red Cross Society, 29 September 2023, <https://redcross.org.ua/news/2023/09/56189>; Mandatory mine safety lessons to be introduced in Ukrainian schools, Ukrayinska Pravda, 14 August 2023, <https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2023/08/14/255909>.

rescued 4,430 people, and provided psychological assistance to more than 232,000 people.²⁴

The activities of fire and rescue services were hampered, especially early in the war, by significant losses of equipment, administrative, office and warehouse buildings. As of 8 December 2022, the SES lost more than 1,600 pieces of equipment (984 seized, 88 destroyed, 552 damaged) and 863 real estate objects (511 seized, 51 destroyed, 301 damaged). While extinguishing fires at critical infrastructure facilities caused by enemy rocket and artillery shelling, there were problems with water supply due to the destruction of pipelines. Emergency response in combat zones became difficult due to increasingly restricted safe access to the places of assignment. Tasks in the combat zone are very dangerous, as rescuers constantly risk their health and lives, working under continuous and heavy shelling.²⁵ Ukraine received substantial assistance in eliminating the consequences of hostile shelling under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (see Section 1 of this publication).

Warning and preparation of the population

Warnings during wartime are an element of resilience and are not limited to air raid alerts. They also include evacuation notices, humanitarian aid updates, mine warnings, and many others. During the war in Ukraine, state and non-state actors have created many information resources to alert the population about various events or activities. Some of them evolve constantly, increasing the effectiveness of information services. The efficiency of others is often limited by inadequate accessibility, quality, and timeliness of information updates. This is most often the case with central and local government agencies.



Car of Mobile Alert System

²⁴ SES operational information, 13 December 2023, <https://dsns.gov.ua/uk/news/nadzvicaini-podiyi-operativna-informacia-dsns-shhodo-naslidkiv-vedennia-boiovix-dii-rosiiskoiu-federacijeu-368>.

²⁵ Actions of SES units under martial law, Institute for Public Administration and Civil Protection Research, 2023, pp. 136-144, <https://dsns.gov.ua/upload/1/9/2/4/3/5/9/diyi-dsns-objednana-kniga-compressed.pdf/>



Another problem is that many people are not interested in and do not use these resources, which significantly reduces people's safety in the event of relevant threats and limits the effectiveness of the state's response.

Inadequate capacity of central state authorities, military and civil-military administrations, and military command to effectively coordinate their actions on providing the population with centralised, general information on evacuation, humanitarian aid, and mobilisation creates the situation, where parts of the civilian population have to rely on unverified information from social media. This makes people more vulnerable to false information and disinformation and leaves them without critical assistance.

In the pre-war and wartime period, almost all central government bodies, subordinate educational and research institutions, many domestic and foreign NGOs and international agencies have been and continue working to prepare the population of Ukraine for war. Each of these entities makes a significant contribution to such preparation, albeit with varying efficiency. Common problems include a lack of coordination and attempts to cover as much knowledge and skills as possible, focusing on the number of events rather than reaching the widest possible audience. As a result, despite the impressive reporting, a significant part of Ukrainian society remains poorly informed and insufficiently active in civil defence in particular and in defence of the homeland in general.

There is much work to be done to introduce a culture of security in the central and local government bodies of Ukraine and in Ukrainian society.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE MILITARY

Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) is generally understood as interaction, co-operation and coordination of a particular military structure with the civilian environment, their mutual support, joint activity planning, constant information sharing at all levels between military and civilian institutions, organisations and agencies in order to achieve certain military objectives while heeding the needs of the civilian environment (including protection of civilians).

At the end of 2018, the Armed Forces of Ukraine established a Working Group on the collection and summarisation of information on civilian casualties and deaths.²⁶ Its main function is to record cases of civilian injury or death in the conflict zone. The group regularly reported to the Joint Forces Commander, summarised the information collected, and developed proposals to minimise civilian casualties.



With the outbreak of a large-scale war, the area of Ukraine Defence Forces' responsibility extended to the territory of northern, central, eastern and southern Ukraine and overlapped with the competences of many other state and local authorities and civil society organisations, also transforming civilian protection from an auxiliary task to one of the main CIMIC tasks, a crucial component of military planning, preparation and conduct of operations.²⁷

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine came as a surprise to many both inside and outside the country. Sectoral state services and numerous humanitarian organisations appeared unprepared for the scale of casualties, destruction and humanitarian needs caused by the terrorist state. Under these circumstances, a significant part of the burden of protecting civilians and meeting humanitarian needs has fallen on local authorities, volunteer organisations and international partners. The Armed Forces and other law enforcement agencies of Ukraine play an important role in protecting, evacuating and providing humanitarian assistance to residents of frontline settlements.

²⁶ In June 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the General Staff and the US-based NGO Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIMIC). Within the joint project, the Joint Forces Commander signed an Order No. 851 of 29 December 2018 «On the establishment of the Working Group on the collection and summarisation of information on civilian casualties and deaths». See White Book 2018, The Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2019, <https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WB-2018.pdf>.

²⁷ The role of civil-military co-operation in the protection of civilians: The Ukraine experience, CIVIC, October 2023, <https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Co-operation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf/>.



The main CIMIC areas in protecting the population during the hostilities in Ukraine include evacuation, humanitarian demining, emergency medical care, public education, etc. In performing these tasks, CIMIC officers join forces with military administrations, territorial defence forces, AFU logistics and medical support services, the National Guard, the National Police, the State Emergency Service, and volunteer formations of territorial communities. At the same time, it is the CIMIC units that are responsible for coordinating civilian protection measures between military administrations and military command.

Evacuation and humanitarian assistance

In 2022, Ukraine Defence Forces evacuated 600,000 civilians from the areas of hostilities,²⁸ including about 150,600 people from Zaporizhzhia oblast, over 108,000 from Sumy oblast, over 89,600 from Donetsk oblast, over 80,000 from Kherson oblast, 57,000 from Luhansk oblast, 50,000 from Zhytomyr oblast, 40,300 from Kharkiv oblast, over 21,000 from Kyiv oblast, and 9,500 from Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In order to provide the civilian population in the frontline areas and affected settlements with basic necessities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine escorted and distributed humanitarian aid totalling over 2 million tonnes.

In 2023, this work continued, albeit on a smaller scale. It was particularly tense in the Kupiansk, Avdiivka, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson sectors, where Russian troops resorted to intensive shelling of frontline settlements. Some communities were subjected to forced evacuations of families with children, the elderly and people with limited mobility. Many of these people refused to evacuate, suggesting that in peacetime, there was no appropriate educational work with these groups, or it was of poor quality. In wartime, this creates delays in evacuation efforts and exposes both civilians and evacuation officials to additional danger.

²⁸ In 2022, the military helped evacuate more than 600,000 civilians from the war zone. Ukrinform, 1 January 2023,, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3644644-u-2022-roci-vijskovi-dopomogli-evakuuvati-z-rajoniv-bojovih-dij-ponad-600-tisac-civilnih.html>.



Humanitarian demining

The bulk of the tasks of organising, coordinating and carrying out mine clearance in Ukraine are carried out by the National Mine Action Authority, the Mine Action Centre (MAC) of the State Special Transport Service at the Ministry of Defence, together with the Humanitarian Demining Centre of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and in close co-operation with leading domestic and foreign NGOs.

MAC's main areas of activity include demining of transport infrastructure, industrial facilities and buildings, and agricultural land. As of November 2023, the MAC specialists identified 1,400 mined areas (20,000 hectares), conducted 141 mine action training sessions, certified 8 mine action operators, and another 9 are in the process of certification. The demining involves 5,000 MAC employees and students of specialised educational institutions.²⁹

In general, the military's assistance in demining during the war has two formats. In the immediate vicinity of combat areas, military engineers are basically the only ones who can clear roads and terrain or dispose of UXOs for the local population. When necessary, local authorities contact the brigade command and staff sapper units are allocated to help them.

Assistance is more systematic in the areas liberated from the enemy, where it is possible to inspect farms, yards and backyards, cemeteries, roads to gardens and pastures in a more calm and planned manner. After all, the quickly retreating occupiers usually leave behind many dangerous items.

In particular, after the occupiers withdrew from Chernihiv region, the Operational Command «North» launched the humanitarian initiative «The Armed Forces of Ukraine Lend a Helping Hand». A sapper group responds to the local residents' requests in a timely manner and inspects the area for explosive devices.

²⁹ Facebook post by the State Special Transport Service, 7 November 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/uadsst/posts/pfbid02pL8s33YUmTzawUxcuWH37Qoqdpysih1DwAgowQEeeJf3h8iwaEHMCCc9twTGoayl>.



AFU sappers receive demining equipment, November 2023. Photo by the Come Back Alive Foundation

which contributes to the quality of humanitarian demining.³¹

In addition to clearing the territory, the servicemen carry out preventive work to make sure that people voluntarily hand over ammunition and weapons left by the occupiers.³⁰

On the other hand, the AFU demining units receive technical assistance from charitable foundations and NGOs,

Medical assistance

In the immediate vicinity of combat areas, military medics are virtually the only ones who can provide health services to the local population. They have saved many civilian lives.³² Within the framework of the initiative «The Armed Forces of Ukraine Lend a Helping Hand», Ukrainian medics help not only the military but also all civilians, volunteers and foreigners in need of medical assistance.

In regions further away from the frontline, military medics help civilians more systematically. In particular, as part of the aforementioned humanitarian initiative, military medics from | the Operational Command «North» help the population by sending teams of therapists, neurologists and paediatricians.³³



³⁰ Military engineers of the «North» Operational Command help the population of Chernihiv region. Facebook page of the Operational Command «North», 31 May 2022, https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2159318037582316/?paipv=0&eav=AfaORPpVTInNepOeM5YQpL4ASejY9ntu4iJA57m46E_Y-iMfMQ10A7Yevf0hxE9_fDc&_rdr.

³¹ Ukraine equips 25 demining teams with support from Come Back Alive Foundation, Militarnyi Portal, 3 November 2023, <https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukraine-equips-25-demining-teams-with-support-from-come-back-alive-foundation/>.

³² S.Nuzhnenko. Angels of War: How combat medics work in hot spots, Radio Svoboda, 7 July 2023, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/photo-den-medyka-front/32523010.html>.

³³ S.Bilous. Military medics help the population of Chernihiv region. CHEline, 8 June 2022, <https://cheline.com.ua/news/society/vijskovi-mediki-dopomagayut-naselennyu-chernigivshhini-301085>.



In addition, at the request of local communities, military doctors arrange appointments for residents of settlements that have been under Russian occupation. In such cases, the most common health problems are stress, psycho-emotional disorders, pain, hypertension, cardiovascular diseases, and stomach problems. In addition to providing on-site care, doctors also bring the necessary medicines provided by volunteer organisations.

Preparation of the population

Given the gaps in the authorities' information work mentioned in the previous section, as well as CIMIC units' experience in protecting civilians, these units could (and should) have provided some assistance to local administrations. However, there were no centralised effort or recommendations from CIMIC structures on the development of rules and procedures for evacuation, humanitarian assistance, curfews, or warnings.³⁴

With the outbreak of war, the bulk of tasks related to interaction between the Ukraine Defence Forces and the civilian environment fell on the shoulders of the newly created Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The staffing of the TDF Command and brigades occurred rapidly and, at times, chaotically, without professional recruitment and training, including of CIMIC officers. Consequently, during the initial months of combat operations, their activities were carried out somewhat haphazardly, without a full understanding of the functions and tasks of civil-military co-operation. The success of CIMIC in this context has been driven by interpersonal soft skills of individual officers who came to TDF from many civilian fields, in particular, their ability to negotiate and cooperate, take the initiative, think and act creatively, and adapt.³⁵

To enhance the CIMIC capacity of the TDF, the Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), in collaboration with the Chernyakhivskyi National Defence University, established a three-day course for TDF troops focused on civil-military co-operation and protection of civilians. The course was

³⁴ The role of civil-military co-operation in the protection of civilians: The Ukraine experience, CIVIC, October 2023, <https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Co-operation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf>.

³⁵ Ibid.



delivered between May and December 2022 in almost all regions of Ukraine. The course was attended by groups of 8-15 officers representing TFD brigades and trained around 200 CIMIC officers in total.

The National Defence University also runs the Retraining and Advanced Training Centre, which offers a one-week course on civil-military relations, democratic civilian control and current issues of national security and defence. The course is attended by the heads and specialists of structural units of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and military command and control bodies of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In 2018, the Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv conducted the inaugural enrolment of cadets for the professional bachelor's programme in Civil-Military Relations; since then, up to 20 cadets who completed the course have been graduating annually. In May 2023, the Institute has launched a two-week course in Civil-Military Relations, which was attended by 33 officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine's Western partners have been assisting in the training of CIMIC officers. Members of Ground Forces, Air Forces, Territorial Defence Forces, Special Operations Forces, National Guard and State Border Guard Service of Ukraine regularly participate in training and advanced training in CIMIC, including at the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in The Hague, the Netherlands, and the Preparation Centre for Foreign Missions (Centrum Przygotowań do Misji Zagranicznych) in Kielce, Poland.



The course on civil-military co-operation according to NATO standards for the Ukrainian military was held in Poland. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 28 августа 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09CbtyRwzU9988ej7kXP-T7Ujk7EnejQK9D4cjMeKxtn95sEqA3rYz-P5vgQeA3tGuLI>

However, even joint efforts are not enough to meet the needs of the Armed Forces (especially the TDF) and other security agencies in staffing CIMIC units with qualified personnel.

Upon agreement and request of local authorities, various AFU specialists (sappers, medics, anti-aircraft gunners, pilots, etc.), are periodically involved in trainings for local residents on mine safety, first aid, air raid alerts, and rules of conduct in areas contaminated with toxic substances.³⁶ The Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) Command has developed a number of training courses for TDF volunteers, as well as general training courses for civilians, namely «Basic combined arms training», «Military training for everyone», «Firearms training», «Tactical medicine», «National patriotic training».³⁷

During the classes, the military provide knowledge and help develop skills that can be useful to every civilian in a war situation: they demonstrate models of various explosive devices, explain how to act in case of dangerous findings, teach the proper equipment and use of medical kits, the rules of first aid, etc.

In collaboration with PR departments of local governments and military administrations, CIMIC officers hold meetings with the public seeking to maintain high morale and unity in society, prevent panic and encourage a spirit of victory.



Co-operation in countering air strikes

In addition to the above traditional areas of military involvement in protection of civilians, new areas emerged during the Ukraine war where the military and civilians can join efforts. One of them is community involvement in air defence.

Ukrainian air defences were able to deprive Russian warplanes of freedom of action above the Ukraine-controlled territories. At the same time, they proved inadequate for the mission of protecting people and critical infrastructure from missile and drone attacks. During the entire

³⁶ See reference 20; see also Civil-Military Co-operation of the Air Force: formation and achievements», 5 May 2023, <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/05/05/chyvilno-vijskove-spivrobitnyctvo-povitryanyh-syl-stanovlennya-j-zdobutky/>.

³⁷ Website of the Territorial Defence Forces, <https://sprotyvg7.com.ua>.



2022, russians attacked Ukraine's power system and civilian utility infrastructure. In the winter of 2022-2023, more than 50% of the energy sector was affected, resulting in temporary power outages in all regions of Ukraine.

The situation has improved significantly after the arrival of Western anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, which has significantly improved the effectiveness of the air defences (now 80-90% of air targets are being shot down). However, the remaining 10-20% of russian missiles and drones, as well as their debris still cause damage and claim civilian lives. Cheap Iranian Shahed-136/131 attack drones and their Russian analogues pose the biggest problem, as they are considered too pricey for expensive anti-aircraft missiles. At the same time, the use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), small-calibre anti-aircraft guns, car-mounted large-calibre and conventional machine guns has proved to be quite effective against them. Equipping and sending mobile groups to the most dangerous areas of approach of highly manoeuvrable drones and cruise missiles is seen as a promising way to further improve the effectiveness of the Ukrainian air defences and is widely used by the Armed Forces, the National Guard and the State Border Guard Service.³⁸




Mobile fire groups demolish Shaheds

Some communities, especially those hardest-hit by air strikes, responded to this initiative by organising mobile fire teams to combat air targets as part of the TDF battalions or volunteer formations. Members of these teams are on duty in their free time and are not paid for their efforts. Vehicles for mounting weapons, fuel, and auxiliary equipment (flashlights, thermal imagers, tablets) are usually supplied by civilian volunteers.³⁹ These units are under the TDF command.

³⁸ See, for example «How the AFU's air defences work against *bledinas*: the story of a mobile group commander», Novynarnya, 6 December 2022, <https://novynarnia.com/2022/12/06/ekozak>; «Mobile air defence systems vs attack drones: a simple solution to effectively shoot down hundreds of Iranian drones», 21 October 2022, https://defence-ua.com/news/mobilna_ppo_proti_udarnih_bezpilotnikov_proste_rishennja_schob_efektivno_zbivati_sotni_iranskih_droniv-9363.html; Border guards showed how mobile air defence groups destroy enemy Shaheds, Ukrinform, 9 November 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3784572-prikordonniki-pokazali-ak-mobilni-grupi-ppo-znisuut-vorozi-sahedi.html>.

A significant contribution to safeguarding people and countering enemy missiles and drones is made by the public air target alert system based on the ePPO (electronic air defence complex) application (<https://eppoua.com>), which allows everyone to report an air target they observe, increasing the timeliness and accuracy of the air defence system's response. The most useful reports come from people living in remote areas, as these are the main routes used by the enemy to reach targets in deep rear of Ukraine. The ePPO system was developed by Ukrainian volunteers and approved by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine.⁴⁰



The ePPO application

PROBLEMS OF ESTABLISHING VOLUNTEER FORMATIONS OF TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES

Volunteer formations of territorial communities (VFTCs) play an important role in protecting the population in emergencies of military, man-made, natural and social nature in co-operation and under the guidance of local authorities, TDF brigades and battalions, local units of the State Emergency Service, the National Guard, the National Police, and the State Border Guard Service.

VFTCs and the legislative acts that regulate their activities can be divided into three categories according to their sphere of competence:

- ✓ civil protection, VFTCs CP (the Civil Protection Code of Ukraine);⁴¹

³⁹ Mobile fire teams received eight additional off-road vehicles in Lviv region, Ukrinform, 8 December 2023, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3797596-na-lvivsini-mobilni-vognevi-grupi-otrimali-se-visim-pozaslahovikiv.html>.

⁴⁰ Ukrainians can help anti-aircraft gunners to shoot down enemy drones and missiles through the ePPO app, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, 13 October 2022, <https://gur.gov.ua/content/ukraintsicherez-zastosunok-ieppo-mozhut-dopomohty-zenitnykam-zbyvaty-vorozhi-drony-ta-rakety.html>.

⁴¹ The Civil Protection Code of Ukraine, <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5403-17#Text>.



- ✓ law enforcement and protection of the state border, VFTCs LE (the Law of Ukraine «On the Participation of Citizens in the Protection of Public Order and the State Border»);⁴²
- ✓ territorial defence, VFTCs TD (the Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of National Resistance»);⁴³

Each of these categories has its own specifics and differences and, hence, problems related to the formation, activity and support of these volunteer formations. The main factors that adversely affect the performance of public protection systems are the perception (sometimes inadequate) of real and potential threats by the population and authorities, resource constraints at the national, regional and local levels, lack of trust in state institutions, and differences between national, sectoral and local interests.


If the level of threats of accidents, mining, and fires and their perception in society is high enough, then state and communities' attitudes are adequate. In particular, now there are more than 1,000 local state-supported and about 1,300 voluntary fire brigades in Ukraine. The number of the latter is rapidly increasing to over 2,000.

Ukraine receives enormous assistance from foreign partners in terms of technical equipment for rescue, demining and fire services.⁴⁴

⁴² The Law of Ukraine «On the Participation of Citizens in the Protection of Public Order and the State Border», <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1835-14#Text>.

⁴³ The Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of National Resistance», <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-20#Text>.

⁴⁴ SES to receive special equipment from the Chemonics Partnership for a Strong Ukraine Foundation, 18 August 2022, <https://mvs.gov.ua/news/dsns-otrimaje-specobladnannya-vid-fondu-partnerstvo-za-silnu-ukrayinu-chemonics>; Ihor Klymenko: transparent use of assistance from partners is a precondition for effective co-operation, SES Press Service, 13 October 2023, <https://zt.dsns.gov.ua/news/ostanni-novini/igor-klimenko-prozore-vikoristannia-otrimanoyi-vid-partneriv-dopomogi-umova-efektivnoyi-spivpraci>.



* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest extent of facilitating and «5» means the highest extent of facilitating.

Representatives of local authorities interviewed by the Razumkov Centre believe that SES is the most supportive of the creation of VFTCs (3.7 points on a 5-point scale; see Annex).

Although there are still many problems in this area, most of them are of a purely technical nature, that is, complex tasks that are addressed by joint efforts of the SES, local authorities and communities.

The opposite trend is observed with VFTCs TD. Their number has been decreasing from almost 1,000 at the end of 2022 to less than 250 today. This process continues, causing outrage among patriotic members of DFTG, who put a lot of effort into their establishment and defence of their settlements from Russian invasion at the beginning of the war, and now find themselves useless and ignored when decisions are made to liquidate their respective units.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ See, for example, Someone’s trying to dissolve Kyiv VFTCs TD unlawfully and with maximum silence, Spilno, 7 November 2022, <https://spilno.org/interview/dobrovolchi-formuvannya-kyyeva-namahayutsya-nepravomirno-ta-z-maksymalnym-zamovchuvannyam-rozpustyty>.



The process of reducing the number of VFTCs TD is related to several objective and subjective factors:

1. Defence plans are being reviewed and updated, territories are prepared accordingly, along with relevant changes in the structure and capabilities of the defence forces,⁴⁶ while the details of these changes are not made public for obvious reasons.

2. Resource (technical and financial) limitations at the levels of the TDF Command, military administrations and local self-governments also affect VFTCs TD. The situation is further complicated by the government's attempts to redistribute financial resources from the local to the state level.

3. Many VFTCs TD members were «washed out» by mobilisation and insufficient material motivation in the context of critically limited sources of livelihood in the war. The actual size of individual VFTCs TD units is limited to their leadership.

4. It is more convenient and useful for the TDF Command to form combat-ready TDF battalions than «quasi-military» VFTCs TD, although work with VFTCs TD is improving.⁴⁷ On the other hand, local communities cannot help but react to the fact that if the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces decides to use the VFTCs TD outside the defined territorial defence zone, according to the Law «On the Principles of National Resistance», the respective settlements may be left defenceless.

5. There are differences in the positions of communities in eastern, northern and southern Ukraine – which have fully experienced the horrors of war, still feel the danger of their return and therefore know the real value of the VFTCs TD – as opposed to many communities in the western and parts of the central Ukraine, which only face occasional russian missile attacks. The latter prefer local volunteer units for civil protection – fire and rescue teams.

⁴⁶ A. Barhylevych, Commander of the Territorial Defence Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: We must always be one step ahead of the enemy, Holos Ukrainy, 5 December 2023, <http://www.golos.com.ua/article/375417>.

⁴⁷ Ibid; see also The Public Council of the Ministry of Defence discussed the activities of the DFTG, ArmyInform, 28 February 2023, <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/02/28/na-gromadskij-radi-pry-minoborony-rozglyanuly-pytannya-diyalnosti-dftg>.




Despite facing these and many other problems, Ukraine cannot treat them as insoluble and simply axe VFTCs TD, especially when society understands the need for such units and sees their usefulness in protecting communities, in particular from enemy ground forces. In this case, the following approach could be the most reasonable:

1. Define the VFTCs TD sphere of responsibility more clearly. Their main task should be protecting local communities, assisting the police, local state and voluntary civil protection units, and training the population. Under large-scale mobilisation, the VFTCs TD personnel will be recruited into the Armed Forces, and in a reduced number they will be unsuitable (partially suitable) for performing more complex tasks of the TDF, especially outside their area of responsibility. At the same time, VFTCs TD could become organisational hubs for public's efforts to prepare the population and train the mobilisation reserve. If necessary, in the event of enemy forces approaching settlements, they could become a nucleus for organising *temporary* volunteer formations, which would later be transformed into TDF battalions. But for this to happen, the TDF Command and local communities will have to do much more to equip these VFTCs TD.

2. It is advisable to subordinate VFTCs TD to the governing bodies of territorial communities and coordinate their activities with local governments and the command of relevant security forces (Territorial Defence Forces, National Guard, National Police, State Border Guard Service, State Emergency Service). This opinion is shared by 56% of local government representatives surveyed by the Razumkov Centre. Meanwhile, 40% believe that DFTG should be subordinated directly to the relevant security forces (see Annex).

3. Taking into account the mobilisation's strong negative impact on the size of VFTCs TD personnel, it is advisable to limit voluntary recruitment to persons unfit (or partially fit) for military service due to age or health. Other volunteers may join these units on a temporary basis – until they are called up for military service.

The resource provision of the VFTCs TD largely depends on the attitude and capabilities of the state and local communities. The expert



* On a 5-point scale, where «1» means an extremely negative attitude and «5» means a very positive attitude.

survey shows that the attitude of communities to the activities of DFTG and other voluntary formations scored 4 points on a 5-point scale (Annex).

Self-government leaders in 20-30% communities justify their lack of attention to creating and supporting VFTCs TD by the absence of money in the local budget (see table below). However, the experience of other communities shows that this depends not so much on financial constraints

ABILITY OF TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES TO CREATE VOLUNTEER FORMATIONS ON THEIR OWN,
Average score*

Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»	
VFTCs TD	1.9	21.2	23.1	25.0	28.8	3.6
VFTCs CP	7.7	9.6	26.9	23.1	28.8	3.6
VFTCs LE	9.6	21.2	21.2	7.7	34.6	3.4

* On a 5-point scale, where «1» means the lowest ability and «5» means the highest ability.



as on the awareness of the real military threat, ability to correctly prioritise expenditures, ability to attract assistance, efficient management of resources and transparency of expenditures.

For example, the Municipality of Trostyanets city, despite the significant costs of reconstruction works in the city, managed to accumulate UAH 1.3 million in the local budget for the VFTC TD needs and paid its members a one-off financial assistance of UAH 5-10 thousand.⁴⁸ The city of Sumy spends up to UAH 200 million a year, or almost UAH 17 million a month, from its budget to support nine VFTCs TD (soon to be reduced to four by the decision of TDF Command). The size of the one-off allowance is UAH 15,000.⁴⁹

Given the high probability of continuation of the current war, let alone Ukraine's inescapable existence next to an aggressor that does not recognise international law, strengthening the defence capability and national resilience of Ukraine in general and the civil defence and protection system in particular should be a priority for both state policy and the activities of local authorities and communities.

CONCLUSION

Ukraine appeared unprepared to ensure proper civilian protection in a full-scale war, given the numerous violations of international norms and rules by the occupiers. This is not only about the objective lack of effective air and missile defences early in the war, but also about the unpreparedness of evacuation systems, rescue services (despite their employees' heroics), protective structures for the population and critical infrastructure to operate under an unpredictable load.

Moreover, it was inability to predict the scale and nature of Russia's armed aggression, to prepare the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other security forces, and the civil protection system in advance that was the main

⁴⁸ Local authorities decide how much to pay community volunteers – Trostianets Mayor Yuriy Bova, Ukrainian Radio, 22 May 2022, <https://ukr.radio/news.html?newsID=98785>.

⁴⁹ How much does it cost to maintain DFTG in Sumy, SpecKor, 6 September 2023, <http://spec-kor.com.ua/news/communities/5152-skilky-koshtuie-utrymannia-dfth-v-VFTCs-TD-sumakh.html>.



reason for the large-scale destruction and civilian casualties. Both central and local authorities are to blame for this.

Civil-military co-operation in protecting the population faced a significant challenge – the extension of the area of responsibility to the entire territory of Ukraine. Under these circumstances, the number and level of training of CIMIC officers in the existing and newly created security forces (such as the Territorial Defence Forces) could not meet the real needs. However, thanks to the efforts of the political and military leadership, the selfless work of CIMIC officers and all security forces personnel, and the invaluable assistance of civilian volunteers and foreign partners, the situation is «normalising», if it is appropriate to say so in war.

VFTCs TD have made a significant contribution to disrupting the aggressor’s plans and strengthening Ukraine’s national resilience. In many cases, VFTCs TD were the first to arrive to the defence lines, to respond to fires and other accidents. Work to improve their formation, management, and comprehensive support should continue, taking into account the lessons learned and current and future needs.

3.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After the invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine faced very serious challenges of protecting its population and maintaining national resilience. Although the Ukrainian people and the state have coped with these challenges, they must take a realistic and responsible approach to learning from these positive and negative lessons.

Some of these lessons can be learnt by embracing foreign countries' experience in building systems to protect the population in emergency situations, including military ones. The main components include clear division of powers and, more importantly, responsibility between the state and local levels of governance and operation of the civil protection system; emphasis on active civil society engagement, volunteering and decentralisation; the significance of training and encouragement of people in protecting the population and ensuring resilience at the national and local levels; implementation of an integrated approach to prevention, response and elimination of consequences of a wide range of emergency situations.

The problems with protecting the population that surfaced during the large-scale war with Russia, especially at its initial stages, have prompted rethinking of state policy and practice in civil protection and civil-military co-operation. This makes it possible to improve them now and in the future. Some of the main areas of this process may include the following:

- ✓ conducting revision, mutual coordination and codification of legislative and regulatory acts in the field of national resilience, the role and place of the state, territorial communities and civil society organisations;
- ✓ improving processes, procedures, mechanisms of activity and interaction of all components of the defence and civil protection systems, bringing the skills of their use to automatism;



- ✓ improving mechanisms of responsibility of central and local authorities, their heads and employees for the assigned area of work, decision-making and their implementation, especially in prioritising of resources spending;
- ✓ establishing partnerships between the state and society in protecting the population, as well as effective interaction between law enforcement agencies and civil society organisations, especially with the volunteer movement;
- ✓ introducing real democratic control not only over the security forces, but also over all government agencies;
- ✓ attracting foreign assistance and using it effectively, initiating constructive relations with existing and potential foreign partners.

One of the main reasons for problems that exist in organisation, management, and implementation of protection measures at all levels is the lack of a security culture in the state and society. Therefore, special focus should be on training and professional development of specialists in all areas and at all levels, with an emphasis on systematic thinking and the ability to make complex decisions quickly, and on preparing the population for action in emergencies with an emphasis on understanding the sources and methods of threats, rules of conduct during their occurrence and elimination of consequences.

As the world enters a period of renewed high-intensity conflicts, Ukraine is doomed to exist next to the aggressor. This threat will not disappear even if Russia collapses. Therefore, along with the sought-after international security guarantees, Ukraine needs to significantly strengthen its defence capabilities and national resilience on a permanent basis. In addition to relevant reforms in the defence and civil protection systems, this unfortunately implies the militarisation of all spheres of state and society, requiring a revision of state policy priorities for the short and long term, including plans for post-war recovery.

This study covered only some issues of protecting the population and civil-military co-operation, the role and place of the state and the public sector. All of this could well be the subject of separate studies.

PROBLEMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES IN PROTECTING THE POPULATION IN HOSTILITIES

(results of an expert survey)¹

There is no unity of opinion among the surveyed experts regarding the subordination of volunteer formations of territorial communities (VFTCs). 56% believe that such formations should be subordinated to the governing bodies of territorial communities, also coordinating their activities with local governments and the security forces command. 40% think that VFTCs should only be subordinated to the relevant command of security forces, which plan their activities within the framework of state policy and in the interests of territorial communities.

Answers to this question largely depend on the experts' place of work. In particular, three quarters (75%) of those who work in local state administrations believe that VFTCs should be subordinated to the governing bodies of territorial communities, while only 25% share a different opinion. At the same time, only 37.5% of experts working in civil-military administrations believe that it would be good to subordinate VFTCs to community governments, while 50% share the opposing opinion. The distribution of responses from local government experts is close to the general one – 55% and 41%, respectively.

¹ The survey was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service with the financial support of the Hanns Seidel Stiftung Büro Kyiv on 3-14 November 2023 involving 52 experts (representatives of local state administrations, civil-military administrations, and local governments) in 14 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.



Expert assessments of the ability of VFTCs to effectively perform their tasks are moderately positive. According to the experts, such formations are relatively more effective in territorial defence – 3.9 points on a 5-point scale. At the same time, no experts gave the lowest score to the effectiveness of these units.

The average scores for the ability of VFTCs to effectively work in civil protection and to support law enforcement and state border protection were 3.7 points each.

At the same time, most experts (56%) consider it expedient to combine the functions of territorial defence, law enforcement and state border protection, and civil protection within one volunteer formation. The creation of separate volunteer units for each of these three functional categories is considered appropriate by 31% of the surveyed experts.

Experts assess the ability of territorial communities to create volunteer formations on their own as mediocre – 3–4 points on a 5-point scale. Thus, the ability of territorial communities to independently create VFTCs for territorial defence (VFTCs TD) and VFTCs for civil protection (VFTCs CP) was rated by experts at 3.6 points on average, and VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection (VFTCs LE) at 3.4 points.

The expert assessments of citizens' readiness to join voluntary formations of territorial communities are roughly the same: readiness to join VFTCs TD, for civil protection and for law enforcement and state border protection scored 3.6 points, 3.3 points, and 3.5 points respectively on a 5-point scale.

The experts also assessed the current legal framework for the activities of these types of volunteer units in terms of protecting the population as mediocre. The average scores were 3.4 points for VFTCs TD, and 3.2 points each for VFTCs PC and VFTCs LE.

On average, the experts were unanimous in assessing the attitude of communities towards the creation and activities of various volunteer groups, giving 4 points on a 5-point scale, where «1» means an extremely negative attitude and «5» means a very positive attitude.



Somewhat lower were the average scores of how various state bodies and institutions facilitate the VFTCs. Thus, the experts measured the degree of assistance from the State Emergency Service at 3.7 points, the National Guard at 3.4 points, the Ministry of Defence, the National Police and state administrations at 3.3 points each, and from the State Border Guard Service at 3.1 points.

Experts highly appreciate the importance of various incentives for citizens to join VFTCs. Therefore, the best incentive, according to experts, is retaining all categories of jobs and average salaries for VFTCs members during their training and performing of respective tasks. The average rating of this incentive was 4.4 points on a 5-point scale.

The importance of extending the social and legal protection guarantees under the Law of Ukraine «On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families» to VFTCs TD members during their training and performing territorial defence tasks scored 4.2 points.

Such incentives as the inclusion of time spent by VFTCs members of all categories in training and performing relevant tasks in their pensionable service record, as well as exemption from mobilisation of VFTCs TD members contributing to territorial defence each scored 4 points.

Experts assess the negative impact of various factors on the VFTCs effectiveness as not too high. According to experts, the worst impact is caused by the uncertainty of the VFTCs legal status, the mismatch between the legal framework and the real situation and needs, as well as shortcomings of the procedure for selecting leaders of volunteer units. Experts rated the impact of these three factors at 3.8 points on average on a 5-point scale.

The average assessment of the negative impact of inadequate level of training of VFTCs members was 3.5 points, while their significant dependence on the positions of local authorities and other groups of influence was assessed at 3.2 points.

The lowest negative impact scores were given to low level of interest from the authorities and local self-governments (2.9 points), opposition



from the authorities or certain political forces (2.8 points) and attempts to involve VFTCs in illegal activities (2.8 points).

Experts widely believe that VFTCs activities should primarily be funded from the community and local government budgets. This opinion is shared by 83% of experts. Three quarters of the respondents (75%) also mention special funds that can be filled by citizens and business communities' inputs as a possible source of funding. State budget and international aid funds were named by 69% of experts each. 65% of experts believe that funding can be provided through targeted voluntary contributions to community budgets and local governments, and 61.5% – through direct charitable contributions.

TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

SUBORDINATION OF VOLUNTEER FORMATIONS OF TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES (VFTCs) % expert responses	
VFTCs should be subordinated to the governing bodies of territorial communities, also coordinating their activities with local governments and the command of security forces (Territorial Defence Forces, National Guard, National Police, State Border Guard Service, State Emergency Service)	55.8
VFTCs should be subordinated to the relevant command of security forces (Territorial Defence Forces, National Guard, National Police, State Border Guard Service, State Emergency Service), which plan their activities within the framework of state policy and in the interests of territorial communities.	40.4
Hard to say	3.8


ABILITY OF VFTCs TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM THEIR TASKS IN ACCORDANCE (with the Law of Ukraine «On the Principles of National Resistance», the Civil Protection Code of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine «On the Participation of Citizens in the Protection of Public Order and the State Border») Average score*							
Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
VFTCs for territorial defence	0.0	5.8	30.8	28.8	32.7	1.9	3.9
VFTCs for civil protection	7.7	1.9	30.8	30.8	28.8	0.0	3.7
VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection	5.8	13.5	15.4	17.3	36.5	11.5	3.7

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest ability and «5» means the highest ability,



**EXPEDIENCY OF COMBINING THE FUNCTIONS OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE,
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STATE BORDER PROTECTION,
AND CIVIL PROTECTION WITHIN ONE VOLUNTEER FORMATION**

% expert responses



**ABILITY OF TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES TO CREATE VOLUNTEER FORMATIONS
ON THEIR OWN,**

Average score*

Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
VFTCs for territorial defence	1.9	21.2	23.1	25.0	28.8	0.0	3.6
VFTCs for civil protection	7.7	9.6	26.9	23.1	28.8	3.8	3.6
VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection	9.6	21.2	21.2	7.7	34.6	5.8	3.4

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest ability and «5» means the highest ability.

QUALITY OF THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR VFTCs ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE CIVIL PROTECTION SYSTEM,

Average score*

Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
VFTCs for territorial defence	0.0	15.4	38.5	25.0	11.5	9.6	3.4
VFTCs for civil protection	7.7	11.5	44.2	13.5	13.5	9.6	3.2
VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection	7.7	9.6	40.4	15.4	13.5	13.4	3.2

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest level of sufficiency and «5» means the highest level of sufficiency.

ATTITUDE OF COMMUNITIES TOWARDS THE CREATION AND ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS VOLUNTEER FORMATIONS,

Average score*

Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
VFTCs for territorial defence	1.9	9.6	19.2	19.2	48.1	1.9	4.0
VFTCs for civil protection	5.8	7.7	19.2	7.7	50.0	9.6	4.0
VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection	9.6	5.8	13.5	9.6	50.0	11.5	4.0

* On a 5-point scale, where «1» means an extremely negative attitude and «5» means a very positive attitude.



EXTENT TO WHICH STATE BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS FACILITATE THE VFTCs, Average score*							
	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
State Emergency Service	9.6	1.9	28.8	19.2	30.8	9.6	3.7
National Guard	7.7	17.3	11.5	23.1	21.2	19.2	3.4
State administrations	11.5	11.5	17.3	28.8	17.3	13.5	3.3
Ministry of Defence (General Staff)	9.6	19.2	9.6	21.2	21.2	19.2	3.3
National Policy	9.6	15.4	17.3	25	19.2	13.5	3.3
State Border Guard Service	17.3	13.5	17.3	13.5	21.2	17.3	3.1

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest extent of facilitating and «5» means the highest extent of facilitating.

CITIZENS' READINESS TO JOIN VFTCs, Average score*							
Type of volunteer formation	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
VFTCs for territorial defence	3.8	9.6	36.5	15.4	26.9	7.7	3.6
VFTCs for law enforcement and state border protection	5.8	13.5	23.1	19.2	25.0	13.5	3.5
VFTCs for civil protection	9.6	9.6	30.8	26.9	15.4	7.7	3.3

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest readiness and «5» means the highest readiness.

IMPORTANCE OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING INCENTIVES FOR CITIZENS TO JOIN VFTCs, Average score*						
Incentives	Scores					Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»	
Extending the social and legal protection guarantees under the Law of Ukraine «On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families» to VFTCs TD members during their training and performing territorial defence tasks	1.9	1.9	15.4	38.5	42.3	4.2
Retaining all categories of jobs and average salaries for VFTCs members during their training and performing of respective tasks	0.0	1.9	17.3	19.2	57.7	4.4
Including of time spent by VFTCs members of all categories in training and performing relevant tasks in their pensionable service record	7.7	7.7	7.7	28.8	44.2	4.0
Exempting VFTCs TD members contributing to territorial defence from mobilisation	13.5	3.8	5.8	13.5	50.0	4.0

* On 5-point scale where «1» means the lowest importance and «5» means the highest importance.



NEGATIVE IMPACT OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ON THE VFTCs EFFECTIVENESS, Average score*							
Factors	Scores					Hard to say	Average score
	«1»	«2»	«3»	«4»	«5»		
Inadequate level of training of VFTCs members	9.6	13.5	19.2	25.0	26.9	5.8	3.5
Low level of interest from the authorities and local self-governments	11.5	23.1	36.5	17.3	7.7	3.8	2.9
Uncertainty of the VFTCs legal status	0.0	9.6	17.3	46.2	21.2	5.7	3.8
Mismatch between the legal framework and the real situation and needs	0.0	5.8	25	44.2	21.2	3.8	3.8
Shortcomings of the procedure for selecting leaders of volunteer units	0.0	15.4	17.3	23.1	28.8	15.4	3.8
Opposition from the authorities or certain political forces	21.2	15.4	26.9	21.2	9.6	5.8	2.8
Significant dependence of VFTCs on the positions of local authorities and other groups of influence	7.7	19.2	26.9	30.8	13.5	1.9	3.2
Attempts to involve VFTCs in illegal activities	28.8	11.5	17.3	9.6	21.2	11.5	2.8

* On 5-point scale where «1» means that negative impact is absent and «5» means the highest negative impact.



POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDING OF VFTCS ACTIVITIES?

Expert responses


Special funds that can be filled by citizens and business communities' inputs, provided that there is an effective public control in place over the distribution and use of these funds



Community and local government budgets



Targeted voluntary contributions to community budgets and local governments




State budget funds



International aid funds, provided that there is an effective public control in place over the distribution and use of these funds



Direct charitable contributions



Yes No Hard to say